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ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned with understanding the role that industrywide
voluntary product standards can play in stimulating economic efficiency,
the stages in the evolution of an industry at which various types of
product standards can be useful, and the potential inefficient effects
which standards may have. In order to address these concerns, a large
conceptual foundation is developed. First three types of economic
efficiency are identified--firm dynamic efficiency, firm static
efficiency, and marketplace efficiency. Second, an empirically-based
model of the sequential patterns of product and process innovation over
the evolution of an industry is described. Third, nine major sources of
economic inefficiency are examined in terms of the types of economic
inefficiency each can cause and the stages in the industry evolutionary
model in which they tend to appear. Fourth, the basic types of
standards, differentiated by technical functionsare identified and
discussed.
On the basis of an integration and extension of the conceptual
foundation, it was found that industrywide voluntary product standards
can positively effect the three types of economic efficiency through
direct impacts, indirect impacts, impacts through use as building blocks
in the development of other standards, and impacts through the discovery
of new technical information as a byproduct of the standards development
process. Sources of inefficiency which can be directly affected by
standards include producers' market and technological uncertainty, buyer
uncertainty, and negative externalities. The types of standards which
can create direct impacts are compatibility standards, variety reduction
standards, and quality standards. Indirect impacts may be as important
as direct ones.
It was found that the introduction of standards may inhibit product
innovation by institutionalizing certain product characteristics from the
point of view of users and producers. The recommendation is made that
only elementary standards be developed in stages of frequent product
change.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Richard D. Tabors
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Table of Contents
Ackn owl edgements
Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter II: Economic Efficiency
Chapter III: A Model of the Sequential Patterns of Innovation
The Abernathy-Utterback Model
Key Themes of the Model
Criticisms of the Abernathy-Utterback Model
Chapter II Revisited--The Relationship between Market
Structure and Economic Efficiency
Extension of the Model--A General Pattern of Response to
Technological Invasion
The Application of the Abernathy-Utterback Model to an
Industry
Chapter IV: An Examination of Potential Sources of Economic
Inefficiency
Market Uncertainty
Technological Uncertainty
The Public Good Nature of Technical Information
Inefficient Market Structure
The Nature of the Production Process
Management Orientation
Buyer Uncertainty
Excessive Transaction Costs
External ities
The Relationship between the Sources of Inefficiency and the
Stages of the Abernathy-Utterback Model
ii
iii
V
1
10
18
18
29
31
33
34
37
41
43
45
47
48
49
50
51
53
54
54
iv
Sources of Inefficiency and Technological Invasion 58
Chapter V: The Basic Technical Functions of Industrywide Voluntary 60
Product Standards
Terminology 61
Measurement Method Standards 62
Test Method Standards 63
Compatibility Standards 64
Variety Reduction Standards 64
Quality Standards 65
Chapter VI: The Role of Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards 70
in Stimulating Economic Efficiency
A Matrix of the Relationship between Types of Standards and 70
Sources of Economic Inefficiency
The Direct Impacts of Standards 73
Potential Negative Effects of Standards 76
Standards by Stages of Introduction and Nature of Direct 78
Impact
Additional Impacts of Product Standards on Sources of 81
Economic Efficiency
The Degree of Impact of Standards 83
Summary and Conclusions 84
Appendix 86
Notes 92
References 97
vACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis is the culmination of some thinking I have been pursuing
for the Utility Systems Program of the MIT Energy Laboratory on and off
over a period of two years. Throughout the process, I have worked under
the guidance of Drew Bottaro, Research Associate at the Energy Lab. I
wish to especially acknowledge Drew's generous support, thoughtful feed-
back, cogent insights, and patiencethrough many drafts and bull sessions.
Drew is an energetic and creative person, so working with him was both a
positive and enlightening experience. In addition, I greatly appreciate
Drew's assistance in arranging financial support for the writing of this
thesis.
I would also like to thank Richard Tabors, Manager of the Utility
Systems Program and my thesis advisor, for his comments, humor, and the
intellectual freedom he allowed me in writing this document. Larry
Bacow's course in the design of regulatory policy provided me with the
initial insights and confidence to explore the economic role of industry-
wide voluntary product standards. His comments on the thesis proposal
and the thesis itself are also appreciated.
In addition, I am grateful to Chris Hill of the MIT Center for Policy
Alternatives. When I was lost in the early stages of the thesis, his
suggestions helped get me back on track. Therese Moyer's willingness to
work overtime to put the document in its final form will not be forgotten.
Of course, the responsibility for any errors, omissions, and gaps in
logic in the thesis belongs to me.
ICHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
In order to get the sputtering U.S. economy out of its current state,
policy analysts are looking at a number of strategies for stimulating
greater economic efficiency. By achieving efficiency gains (through
product innovation, on the production line, and in the marketplace), it
is hoped that real economic growth will rise and inflationary pressures
fall.
The list of potential tools for generating greater efficiency is a
long one. Possible (or implemented) public sector initiatives include
cuts in the capital gains tax, deregulation, tax credits, increases in
Federally-funded research and development, and modificatons in Federal
patent law. Proposals for the private sector include implementaton of
quality-of-worklife programs and Scanlon plans, and the creation of
incentives for corporate executives to push high-risk, long-range,
innovative strategies which have the potential for high returns.
However, one tool for increasing economic efficiency which both the
public and private sectors can (and do) utilize is not usually mentioned
in the conventional litany of possibilities-- industrywide voluntary
product standards.
Webster's Dictionary defines a standard as "something established by
authority, custom, or general consent as a model or example." 1
Essentially, a standard is a means for institutionalizing a behavior or
understanding. The size of this paper, the way we dress, the printed
word all reflect certain standards. Standards may be formal (codified)
or informal (a tacit understanding between people).
A product standard is a formal standard which institutionalizes a
2certain behavior or outcome regarding a specific commercial product or
type of product. Product standards can specify terminology regarding a
product; methods of measuring, testing, or using a product; or certain
characteristics of the product itself, e.g. size, design, quality.
A product standard can be mandatory (codified by government to protect
the public interest) or voluntary (institutionalized by a producer or a
group of producers).
Industrywide voluntary product standards are developed through
consensus by members of a particular industry. Standards are generally
written by industry trade associations, professional engineering
societies, and other national engineering bodies such as the American
Society for Testing and Materials. The demand for industrywide standards
may originate from the buyers or producers of a particular product.
Standards are sought by producers for many reasons, e.g., to reap the
benefits of production economies of scale, reduce consumer uncertainties,
eliminate substitute goods, increase market share for dominant firms or
reduce the possibility of government imposed mandatory standards. Buyers
of intermediate products, stimulated by cost or quality considerationsor
the threat of government intervention, are also a frequent source of
demand for industrywide product standards. Final consumers tend to be
less organized than intermediate buyers, and therefore are less vocal in
calling for and less powerful in inducing industrywide voluntary
standards.
The process of standards development varies from organization to
organization.2 Standards-writing committees may be dominated by
members of an industry (either the buyers or the sellers of the product
3under review) or may have a balanced representation of buyers, sellers,
and representatives of the public interest. The voluntary standards
developed may be used in a number of ways, as well. Firms in the
industry may or may not follow them. They are often used in contract
specifications, and may be incorporated into local , state and Federal law
as mandatory standards. Testing laboratories, like Underwriters
Laboratory, use them. (For the reader unfamiliar with U.S. voluntary
standard-setting institutions and processes, see Appendix.)
The companies involved in voluntary standard-setting are generally
motivated by their own self-interest. (Even members of engineering
society committees see themselves as representing their respective
employers.)3 The synthesis of interests coming out of the
consensus-building process may or may not result in standards which
encourage efficiency in the production line, in the development of
innovations, or in the marketplace. Standards may freeze a technology
before its development is complete, may prevent alternative technologies
from being pursued, or may facilitate the monopolization of supply by a
particular company.
Furthermore, the people who write standards are technical experts for
the most part. Given that most standards-writing is done by technical
experts pursuing private-sector interests, it is likely that much
standard-setting activity takes place without a clear appreciation of the
efficiency benefits or costs standards can have for society as a whole.
Unfortunately, economists also have not appreciated the role of
industrywide voluntary product standards in stimulting efficiency--the
literature on the subject is almost non-existent. The primary work is
4David Hemenway's Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards (1975), but
this book ignores the relationship between innovation and standards, and
is not satisfactory in its development of theory.
In light of the large gap in the literature, the purpose of this
thesis is to answer the following question: what role can industrywide
voluntary product standards play in stimulating economic efficiency, and
how should they be implemented to play this role? More specifically,
1) What sources of inefficiency can industrywide voluntary product
standards help resolve?
2) What are the appropriate chronological points in product
development and diffusion for the promulgation of standards? If
developed too early, standards may retard innovation. On the
other hand, commercialization of an innovative product may
unnecessarily be held back if standards are delayed too long.
3) How can standards be written so that, in attempting to resolve
certain market failures, they do not exacerbate others? An
example of the problem--if a standard is too design-specific it
may prevent the development of other designs yielding superior
performance.
It is hoped that the answers to these questions will form a theory of
the potential economic role of standards. As theory, the answers will
not fully address the institutional issues so important for the
implementation of the theory. However, such a theory can be of use to
those involved in standard-setting. A better appreciation of societal
interestsmay further private interests. Also, organizations representing
the public interest in standards-setting, such as the National Bureau of
Standards, may find a theory of use to guide their involvement in the
voluntary process.
In order to provide a framework within which to answer the questions,
the paper needs to set forth a rather large conceptual foundation. The
5next three chapters will set out a model of the industrial environment in
which standards function. Chapter II will break down the notion of
economic efficiency into three parts--efficiency in developing
innovations, in production, and in the marketplace. In Chapter III, a
model of the sequential patterns of innovation in industrial products and
processes will be developed--this model draws on the work of William
Abernathy and James Utterback. An understanding of the likely sequence
of and interrelationship between product and production process
innovation is important for the discussion of the appropriate timing of
the various types of standards. Chapter IV uses the two preceding
chapters to describe the significant sources of inefficiency that occur
at each major phase in the evolution of a product and an industry. The
sources of inefficiency will be characterized according to their effects
on the three types of economic efficiency. The last section of the
conceptual foundation (Chapter V) will define and describe the types of
product standards according to technical function. Once the foundation
has been set, the remainder of the paper (Chapter VI) will concern itself
with answering the questions posed earlier.
Because the conceptual foundation is long and complex, a summary of
the findings of each chapter is provided below to give the reader an
overview. An explanation of the findings is left to the main body of
the text.
In order to discuss economic efficiency in a world where innovation
exists, Chapter II will describe three types of economic
efficiency--marketplace efficiency, firm static efficiency, and firm
dynamic efficiency. The first two types are derived from neoclassical
6economics, which holds product and process technology constant. The
third concept, based on the work of Burton Klein is a measure of the
extent to which firms develop product and process innovations.
Drawing on the empirically-derived model of William Abernathy and
James Utterback, Chapter III traces the sequential patterns of innovation
over the evolution of an abstract industry and its product. Essentially,
in the early stages of an industry and product development, major and
frequent product innovations take place; competition between firms tends
to be over product performance. As time goes on, a dominant product
design is adopted by the market; product change becomes less frequent and
more incremental. When products share a dominant design, competition
tends to be over reducing product cost.
- In the early stages, the production process tends to be
flexible and labor-intensive because of small market volume and the need
to adapt to frequent innovation. Later, as product demand and production
volume rise, production process innovations tend to become frequent,
yielding significant economies of scale. They are sought because, after
dominant design, the competitive emphasis is on cutting costs. Process
innovations usually lead to greater capital intensity, which often
inhibits further major product innovation because of the costliness of
overhauling the production process.
Using the terms of economic efficiency of Chapter II, a high level of
dynamic efficiency tends to occur in the early stages of industry and
product development--product innovationis frequent due to a large
untapped technological potential and flexible production process. Static
efficiency is sacrificed somewhat. In the later stages, the focus is on
7achieving a high level of static efficiency; dynamic efficiency tends to
be inhibited by the rigidity of the production process.
Chapter IV identifies the major sources of inefficiency, their
impacts on the three types of efficiency, and their general stages of
appearance in the evolution of an industry. Thus, Chapter IV integrates
and extends the work of the previous two chapters. The major sources of
inefficiency include producers' market uncertainty, technological
uncertainty, the public good nature of technical information, inefficient
market structure, narrow management focus, buyer uncertainty, excessive
transaction costs, and negative externalities. For
example, buyer uncertainty about the performance of a product is a
marketplace inefficiency in that buyers do not have accurate product
information' it tends to be most significant when a product is new to
the market.
The basic types of industrywide voluntary product standards will be
described in Chapter V. The elements of the typology are differentiated
by the type of technical outcome to be induced by the information being
communicated, i.e. by technical function. We have identified six basic
types of standards, each with a distinct technical function:
1) Terminology--establishes a common language for a product, product
components, product characteristics, units of measurement, and
patterns of behavior.
2) Measurement method standards-- specify methods for quantitatively
measuring the physical characteristics or properties of objects.
Examples are standards for measuring size, level of radiation,
temperature, and viscosity.
3) Test method standards--specify methods for testing the
characteristics, properties, or performance of a product pursuant to
quality or compatability standards. Test method standards often rely
on measurement method standards.
84) Quality standards--establish criteria which indicate acceptable
and unacceptable product performance, design, or materials. Quality
standards can be divided into several categories, such as durability
standards, efficiency standards (e.g., miles-per-gallon standards for
cars), safety/environmental standards, and output/outcome standards.
5) Variety reduction standards--establish a limited and discrete
variety of acceptable product characteristics (e.g., physical
dimensions, output levels) for the purpose of achieving production
economies of scale and/or reducing buyer information costs.
6) Compatibility standards--specify the characteristics or
properties a product shall have in order to be compatible with a
conjoint product (e.g., standards for light bulbs which make them
compatible with light sockets).
Chapter VI provides the final analysis, integrating and extending the
work which has come before. Standards are found to have four types of
impacts on the sources of inefficiency--direct, indirect, impacts through
use as building blocks for direct-impact standards, and impacts through
the discovery of new technological knowledge as a byproduct of the
standards development process. The sources of inefficiency which can be
uncertainties
directly impacted by standards are market, technological, and buyer/
excessive transaction costs, and negative externalities. The resolution
of these uncertainties can increase all three types of efficiency. Each
type of standard has at least one direct impact on a source of
inefficiency. Terminology, measurement method standards, and test method
standards act as building blocks for the other three types of standards.
New technological knowledge can be discovered through the development of
any of the standards types--this knowledge can reduce technological
uncertainty and the negative effects of the public good nature of
technical information.
One danger in standards development is that standards may retard
future product innovation by institutionalizing certain product
9characteristics. This problem needs to be dealt with by not issuing
detailed standards until the targeted product characteristics seem to
have stabilized in a technological sense.
When discussing an industry in the abstract, it is very difficult to
say which standards have the greatest impact and which types of impacts
are most important. The importance of each impact varies from industry
to industry, depending on the industry's product, market structure,
technological potential and so on.
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CHAPTER II. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The ways in which we allocate our resources have a direct effect on
economic growth. Some patterns of allocation can produce more output
than others, given the same initial input. The term "economic
efficiency" as used here is a relative measure of the productiveness of
possible allocations--some allocations are more "efficient" than others.
For the purpose of this paper, we can distinguish among three types
of economic efficiency: (1) firm dynamic efficiency, (2) firm static
efficiency and (3) marketplace efficiency.
The concepts of firm dynamic efficiency and static efficiency are
drawn from Burton Klein's Dynamic Economics (1977) . Let us assume a
world of imperfect technological knowledge, contrary to the neoclassical
formulation. In this world, product and production process innovations
are always possible. Such innovations allow society to get more utility
for its resources, either through extending society's
production-possibility frontier, or changing the composition of the
frontier by adding final goods with greater utility per unit input than
substitutes which serve an unmet need. (Many new final goods do both.)
A firm's dynamic efficiency is a measure of its contribution to the
expansion of or positive change in the composition of the societal
production-possibility frontier through its addition to technological
knowledge (which it may or may not share with others) and the application
of this new knowledge.2 Applications can take the form of product
innovations or innovations in a firm's production process. Dynamic
efficiency is a relative (and unquantifiable) concept--there can be no
optimal dynamic efficiency because knowledge is incomplete. Klein
11
asserts that dynamic efficiency is a function of competitive risk;
uncertainty regarding profits and market share forces firms to take
technological risks.3
The notion of firm static efficiency is based on the neoclassical
concept of optimal production efficiency, where output is maximized
subject to budget constraints. In the neoclassical formulation,
technological knowledge is perfect--the product is static, and the
production function of all possible combinations of inputs is known.
Accepting the assumption that technological knowledge is imperfect, we
can think of static efficiency as a measure of the extent to which the
firm is able to minimize production costs on the basis of initial
conditions, i.e. existing knowledge. Static efficiency is a measure of
the distance of the firm from the point of cost minimization for the
output produced.
To keep the use of terms clear: the developer of a new cost-saving
product, say a word processor, is being dynamically efficient, while the
buyer of the new cost-saving product is being statically efficient
because the word processor is now, to the buyer, incorporated into a new
set of initial conditions.
Marketplace efficiency measures the extent to which the present
outcomes of exchange between buyers and sellers approaches the pareto
optimal condition, in which no one can be made better off without someone
else being worse off. The situation being observed is static -- no
innovation is being introduced. The degree of marketplace efficiency is
positively related to the degree of effective competition, the extent to
which accurate information is available to buyers and sellers, and the
12
absence of externalities and public goods. These characteristics
influence marketplace efficiency through their impact on prices, the
mechanism by which resources are allocated in an exchange economy.
These three types of efficiency are not independent of one another.
Because a firm has limited resources, there are tradeoffs beween a firm's
degree of static and degree of dynamic efficiency. For instance, a high
dynamic efficiency implies flexibility in the use of resources so as to
quickly be able to utilize new product and process ideas; however,
flexibility may mean that equipment is less specialized than is possible,
and some economies of scale in production are lost. (Costsare not being
minimized on the basis of initial conditions). On the other hand, a high
degree of static efficiency often involves rigid, capital-intensive
production processes which generate large economies of scale but are too
specialized, and therefore too costly, to adapt easily to a series of new
ideas.
The relationship between marketplace efficiency and dynamic
efficiency is a complex one. In theory, optimal marketplace efficiency
requires perfect competition (a very large number of small firms) so
consumers are gaining the largest consumer surplus possible. The
questions is: What type of market structure induces significant dynamic
efficiency?
Perfect competition may be the desired market structure in a
situation where the composition of goods in the production-possibility
curve is fixed. However, perfect competition may not induce much dynamic
efficiency. Scherer (1979) suggests that with a very large number of
firms in a market, the impetus to innovate would be lessened because
13
imitation would quickly reduce any new profits. "Also, if the number of
imitating rivals becomes large, pricing discipline may break down,
causing not only the innovator's share of the pie, but the pie itself, to
shrink. "4
To Klein, dynamic efficiency is positively related to the degree of
profit uncertainty faced by the firmsin an industry, not the number of
firms per se. Profit uncertainty stimulates firms to invest resources
into taking technological risks. A significant degree of competition is
needed between firms to provide this uncertainty--and a certain number of
firms are needed for effective competition. Klein estimates that, as a
rough guess, at least 4 to 8 firms must account for 50 percent of the
market. "If the degree of competitive rivalry is high, industries such
as the aircraft industry can bring about an impressive rate of progress
with fewer than six firms." 5
Scherer posits that firms will make their decisionsabout investing in
technological development of new products in response to two conflicting
factors related to market structure. The stimulus factor is a function
of the number of firms in an industry:
The more evenly matched rivals there are with a stake in the market,
the larger will be the portion (which would otherwise go to rivals)
the innovator gets to enjoy during its term of leadership. Moreover,
by leading the way the innovator may also be able to gain an image
or reputation advantage, enabling it permanently to increase its
market share at the expense of rivals. The larger the share of the
market rivals would command if they exactly matched its new product
introduction date, the more the innovator has to gain by being first
and permanently capturing some of that share, ceteris paribus. Or to
put the point the other way around, the smaller a company's share of
some new product market will be if it fails to lead, the more it has
to gain by leading, and hence the more rapidly it will be inclined to
proceed in its R & D effort. 6
On the other hand, dominant firms are not likely to be vigorous
14
innovators, since there is not much it can take away from others, and, in
Klein's terms, they face low uncertainty.
The market room factor reflects the profits a firm expects to obtain
through product innovation. It says that a larger number of firms,
beyond some point, can discourage innovation because expected profits are
too low:
Whether or not this happens depends largely upon the
interrelationship of five variables: the size of the overall market
profit potential, the number of actual or potential rivals vying to
share that potential , the speed at which rivals are expected to react
and imitate, the degree to which being first confers a permanent
product differentiation advantage, and the magnitude of anticipated
R&D costs. The smaller the new product market's total profit
potential is in relation to any single firm's development costs,
ceteris paribus, the more the presence of a significant number of
rivals is apt to discourage early innovation. 7
In light of these factors and after a review of a number of empirical
studies, Scherer feels that the extent of recognized untapped
technological opportunities in a field is the primary determinant of
whether product innovation best occurs with a large or small number of
rivals. In a field of high technological opportunity, the existence of
large numbers of firms seems to stimulate innovation because of the great
profit potential and belief that success in the marketplace is a result
of innovative leadership. On the other hand, in fields of low and medium
technological opportunity, a degree of oligopoly seems to stimulate
innovation, probably because expected profits and market share need to be
large enough to justify R&D expenditures in a situation of modest profit
potential.
Scherer's analysis coincides with Klein's notion that uncertainty
breeds innovation. Uncertainty is greater the larger the potential for
15
new profits is.
One also would think that process innovation would be stimulated by
uncertainty, where uncertainty is a function of the degree of competition
between firms. According to Abernathy and Utterback, major process
innovations tend to take place once the dominant design of a product is
established. Competition over performance shifts to competition over
cost -- economies of scale are sought. (More about this in Chapter
III.) It seems clear that process innovation can be stimulated by
uncertainty regarding the outcome of price rivalry. However, many major
process innovations require a large product volume to be worthwhile.
Consequently, process innovations may result in a reduction in the number
of firms in an industry, and a lessening of uncertainty. Buyers may
receive the benefits of economies of scale on the one hand, but face
oligopolistic pricing on the other.
In sum, the relationship between marketplace efficiency and dynamic
efficiency is complex. We assume that marketplace efficiency increases
with the number of firms competing. In fields of high technological
opportunity, a large number of firms is also conducive to dynamic
efficiency. However, in fields of less technological opportunity, fewer
firms may be more conducive to product innovation, but this may have a
negative effect on marketplace efficiency. Further, innovations may
result in fewer firms and oligopolistic pricing as the innovations enable
production costs to fall as volume gets very large.
What is the market structure that provides the optimal mix of
marketplace and dynamic efficiency, the optimal mix of competitive
pricing, economies of scale, and product innovation? This is difficult
16
to determine, because it means ascertaining the present discounted value
of future benefits of yet-to-be-invented product and process
innovations. However, the general relationship between market structure
and marketplace and dynamic efficiency seenclear, and will be referred
to as we analyze the role of standards.
Having refined the notion of economic efficiency into three types and
having shown the basic interrelationships between them, we now are also
able to refine the basic question guiding this thesis: what role can
standards play in increasing the three types of economic efficiency?
Given that increasing one type of efficiency may reduce or increase
another, how can standards maximize overall efficiency?
From a quick review of the typology of standards listed in Chapter 1,
we can intuitively see that the implementation of each type of standard
can have different implications for each type of economic efficiency.
For instance, terminology can increase all three types of efficiency
through the facilitation of communication. Quality standards may
increase marketplace efficiency (by reducing consumer uncertainty and
information costs); subsequent increased demand may increase economies of
scale (static efficiency) and generate funds for further research and
development (dynamic efficiency). The context and timing of a standard
has implications as well. A quality standard could be imposed in such a
manner as to lock in an inferior or underdeveloped technology, to the
detriment of dynamic efficiency. Also, we can see potential examples of
the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency. The standardization
of a product through variety reduction may allow investment in
specialized capital equipment which can reduce production costs (and
17
hence increase static efficiency); such capital-intensiveness may,
however, reduce flexibility to respond to innovation.
We can move from an intuitive to a more systematic discussion of the
effect of standards on efficiency after we set out a model of the
sequential patternsof product and process change and the sources of
inefficiency in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER III. A MODEL OF THE SEQUENTIAL PATTERNS OF INNOVATION
After a new product is introduced, the nature of the product and its
manufacturing process usually change over time. The airplane, the
automobile, the light bulb, the computer and the record player all have
evolved significantly since their invention, as have their associated
manufacturing processes. The intent of this chapter is to present and
comment on a model of the sequential patterns of such changes, developed
by William Abernathy and James Utterback in Abernathy's The Productivity
Dilemma (1978), and to extend that model for the purposes of this paper.
The Abernathy-Utterback Model 1
The unit of analysis in the Abernathy-Utterback model is the
"productive unit," which the authors define as "an integral production
process that is located in one place under common managenent to produce a
particular product line."2 Thus the concept of productive unit
takes in both the product line and the manufacturing unit. According to
Abernathy and Utterback:
A productive unit would typically be an operating unit of a firm that
is located in one geographic area under the management of one senior
executive. An engine plant and the line of engines it produced is
one productive unit. An assembly plant and the particular car it
produces is another. 3
One firm can be composed of one or many productive units. A
productive unit can produce final goods, capital goods, or components
(material inputs) to be used in manufacture by other units (within or
outside the firm). This segmentation does not appear to alter the
generality of the model.
The productive unit can be described in terms of a number of
19
characteristics, and change in the productive unit can be described in
terms of changes in these characteristics over time. Production-process
characteristics include: types and sources of material inputs, scale of
operation, production-process equipment (e.g., general purpose,
specialized), production-process configuration (e.g., job shop, assembly
line), necessary work force skills, and methods of organization and
supervision. Product-line characteristics include: degree of product
standardization, frequency of product change, and degree of product-line
differentiation.
Abernathy and Utterback developed their model after an extensive
study of the automobile industry and review of numerous case studies of
technological change in other industries. They discovered great
similarities across industries in the evolution of product and process
technology. The hypothesis underlying the model is that the type,
frequency and locus of innovation change as the productive unit evolves.
In respect to type and frequency, it is expected that major
product innovation will be more frequent initially, relative to
process innovation, but that process innovations will increase
in relative importance as development advances. In respect to
the locus of process innovation,. . .the originating source of
important process innovations is expected to shift from within
to outside the firm.4
The authors perceive that productive units tend to evolve through
three distinct stages: 1) the fluid stage - characterized by frequent
product innovation and a flexible production process, 2) the transition
stage -- in which the frequency of product innovation falls, the
frequency of process innovation rises, and the production process becomes
more capital-intensive and inflexible, and 3) the specific stage in which
the rate of product and process innovation both fall, the product is
20
almost completely standardized, and the production process is very
rigid. Figure 1 depicts the authors' perception of the relation between
stages and rates of technological change.
Tables 1A and 1B, show the structure and flow of the
Abernathy-Utterback model in detail , in terms of the productive unit
characteristics listed before. The model embodies three principal ideas:
"...that there is a normal rate and direction in technological progress,
that progress in one aspect is dependent on that in others, and that a
certain degree of eveness in progression among many different elements is
essential to the advance of any one."5 In the above quote, one may
read "aspect" as "characteristic."
According to the authors, "(t)he model applies most directly to a
productive unit in which multiple inputs are combined and transformed
through a complex production process that yields a highly valued product
whose characterstics may be varied."6 It is not intended to depict
the patterns of innovation in industries with a definitionally
standardized production, e.g. sulphuric acid, nylon, or copper. In these
cases, radical production innovation is by definition limited.
The model begins at the point where a radical product innovation is
developed. Radical product change involves identificaton of an emerging
need or a new way to meet an existing need. Often, the need and
form of the innovation are suggested by potential users. Usually new
firms are founded to exploit the innovation. Existing firms producing
older, competing products tend to be too oriented to existing markets to
understand the opportunities offered by the new product, or tend to be
unwilling, because of sunk costs in specialized production processes,
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Table 1A: Productive Unit Characteristics
A
Product Character-
istics (Main Line)
B C
Mode of Product Process
and Process Change Configuration
D
Task and Labor
Characteristics
E G
Process Equipment Sourcing of Inputs Capacity
From: Custom
product, special-
ized for appeal to
specialized mar-
kets
To: Standard prod-
uct with appeal
to aggregate
markets.
Produced to cus-
tomer order and
specification.
From: Fluid change
To: Incremental
improvement.
Frequent major and
novel product
change.
Prior models made
obsolete.
From: Flexibility
and independence
among included
operations
To: continuous
machine-paced
line flow.
From: High trade
craft skill and
manual tasks
To: Operative skills
To: System overseer
and maintenance
skills.
Job Shop: Craftsman or arti-
Adaptable, fluid san skills re-
flow configuration quired.
From: General-
purpose equip-
ment
To: Specialized in-
tegrated systems.
General-purpose
equipment pre-
dominates.
From: Components
and materials
available through
common supply
channels
To: Devoted chan-
nels, back to raw
material sources.
Commonly available
grades, through
normal distribu-
tion channels.
From: Small scale;
assembly with ill-
defined output
limits
To: Well-defined
processes that are
specialized to
particular prod-
ucts.
Capacity limits ill-
defined. Scale is
small, many com-
ponents pur-
chased.
At least one model
"sold as pro-
duced" in sub-
stantial quantities
(with or without
options).
Dominant product
design (one type
design gains
major market
share, forcing
competitive re-
action).
Highly standardized
product. Options
for different mar-
ket segments
formed as periph-
eral variations
Functionally stan-
dardized prod-
uct(s).
Major but cumu-
lative changes
made to succes-
sive product
models across
product line.
Incremental changes
introduced during
production, with
periodic major
model redesign
across product
line to increase
functional prod-
uct performance.
Long periods be-
tween major
model changes.
Refinements em-
phasized. Changes
no longer made
across all models
in line but are
introduced selec-
tively by model.
Incremental product
change imple-
mented through
process improve-
ment, emphasiz-
ing greater prod-
uct consistency
and standardiza-
tion.
Progressive flow
configuration
around particu-
lar product(s).
Line-flow config-
uration with
separate produc-
tion process for
each standard
product.
Closely balanced,
commonly paced
tasks organized
and controlled by
component.
Technologically
controlled con-
tinuous or near-
continuous flow.
Semiskilled work-
ers; long task
durations, train-
ing on job im-
portant.
Operative skills and
short task dura-
tion (minimum
skills and train-
ing).
Mixed skills and
tasks. Some op-
eratives and oth-
ers monitoring.
Predominant tasks
are equipment
monitoring and
intervention when
equipment fails.
Predominant
skills are process
maintenance.
Some specially de-
signed machines
for key tasks.
Frequent use of
machines that
perform multiple
operations at one
station.
Integration of spe-
cial machines at
some stations to
form islands of
automation
Extensively inte-
grated and direct
linked process de-
signed and pro-
cured as system.
Override of com-
mon distribution
channels and
pricing policies.
Commands espe-
cially designed
input materials
and components
and product de-
velopment ser-
vices by suppliers.
Substantially
devoted input
sources either
through bazk-
ward integration
or other forms of
close supplier
control.
Extensive integra-
tion into raw
materials.
General-purpose
plant of moderate
scale. Capacity
increased by par-
alleling similar
plants.
General-purpose
plant organized
and controlled by
product/market
categories. In-
cludes production
of most compo-
nents. Capacity
increased by in-
vestments to
break bottlenecks.
Capacity organized
by process types.
Separation of dis-
similar or uncom-
mon production
processes from
segment.
Large-scale plant
specialized to
particular process
function, capacity
well defined, in-
creased only by
designing new
facilities.
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o William J. Abernathy
Central
tendency
in devel-
opment
Fluid
1.
2.
3.
4.
Specific
5.
23
Table 1B: Productive Unit Characteristics
Production Process Organizational Control Kind of Capacity
Fluid Boundary
Frequent and novel
product innovation
market
stimulated.
Cumulative product
innovations usually
incorporated in pe-
riodic changes to
model line.
and
Increase in process
innovations-inter-
nally generated.
and
Technology-stimulated
innovation.
Cost-stimulated incre-
mental innovation
predominates. Novel
changes involve
simultaneous prod-
uct and process
adaptations and are
infrequently intro-
duced.
High product-line di-
versity produced to
customer order.
At least one model
sold as produced in
substantial volumes.
Dominant design
achieved.
Highly standardized
product with few
major options.
Commoditylike prod-
uct specified by
technical param-
eters.
Flexible, but ineffi-
cient. Uses general-
purpose equipment
and skilled labor.
Increasingly rational-
ized process config-
uration with line-
flow orientation,
relying on short-
duration tasks and
operative skills of
the work force.
"Islands" of special-
ized and automated
equipment intro-
duced in some parts
of process.
Integrated production
process designed as
a "system."
Labor tasks predomi-
nantly those of sys-
tems monitoring.
Loosely organized.
Entrepreneuri ally
based.
Control achieved
through creation of
vertical information
systems, lateral re-
lations, liaison and
project groups.
Control achieved by
means of goal set-
ting, hierarchy, and
rules as the fre-
quency of change
decreases.
Bureaucratic, verti-
cally integrated, and
hierarchically or-
ganized with func-
tional emphasis.
Small scale, located
near technology
source or user. Low
level of backward
vertical integration.
Centralized, general-
purpose capacity
where scale in-
creases are achieved
by breaking bottle-
necks.
Facilities located to
achieve low factor-
input costs, to mini-
mize disruption, and
facilitate distribu-
tion.
Large-scale facilities
specialized to par-
ticular technologies,
capacity increases
achieved only by
designing new
facilities.
Specific Boundary
From Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma, p. 82
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to take advantage recognized opportunities
Competition among producers of a new product and between them and
producers of older substitutes is generally on the basis of performance
rather than lower cost. First of all , it is obvious to all competitors
that there is room to improve performance. Secondly, early users of the
product often have price-inelastic demand, and the lack of
standardization of the new product (i.e., lack of equal performance)
makes comparison on cost alone not worthwhile. Thus, the competitive
pressures to improve new product performance in order to capture and hold
on to desired market share result in a high rate of product innovation
and radically different product versions soon after initial product
introduction. These major innovations force frequent model changes that
quickly make existing versions obsolete.
When a radical product innovation first appears, performance criteria
are typically vague and poorly understood. "...(T)here is a
proliferation of product-design criteria or performance dimensions.
These frequently cannot be stated quantitatively, and the relative
importance or ranking of the various dimensions may be quite
,7
unstable." Initially, the product line is diverse in the sense that
most products are made to customer order and specification. Market needs
are ill-defined. Because the product is new, the size of the market is
small and often unstable.
Because of low volume, non-standardized products, a high rate of
product change, and market instability, the initial production
configuration tends to be the job shop.
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In the early fluid state, the production process is inchoate, the
duration of labor tasks is long, there is reliance on skilled labor
often organized along trade-craft lines. Flows of work in process
are erratic, inventories are high, and general-purpose equipment is
utilized. In general, the organization of the production process is
like a job shop: there is slack, and capabilities are flexible even
though they are not "efficient" in the same sense as non-production
facilities.8
The transition stages are represented by stages 2-4 in Table lA. In
the first step of the transition process, the productive unit develops a
product "that has sufficiently broad appeal to be produced in long runs
and sold as standard rather than a made-to-order product." 9 Major
product innovations still occur, but these now tend to be cumulative in
nature rather than a radical redesign of the product. The production
process configuration changes from one of a job shop to an intermittent
line-flow movement. "That is, changes are made so that operations are
performed as work moves forward, without retracing, typically in batches
that are processed intermittently."10,11 Semi-skilled workers
replace craftsmen, and some specialized equipment appears. Plant
capacity increases; the firm may build new plants.
The productive unit moves into the stage 3 once a dominant product
design for the industry has been established, "one that attracts a
significant market share and forces imitative competitive design
reaction." 12
The superior designs of products like the DC-3 and the Model T Ford
seem to mark turning points in the development of their respective
productive units. These designs were synthesized from individual
technological innovations that had been introduced independently in
prior products. The important economic effects of a dominant design
afford a degree of enforced product standardization, so that
production economies can be sought, and provide a bench mark for
functional performance competition, so that effective competition can
take place on the basis of cost as well as product performance.
Product design milestones are also apparent in other product lines
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where evidence is available on patterns of development over time.
Sealed refrigeration units for home refrigerators and freezers, the
development of an effective can-seal ing technology in the
food-canning industry, and, in the locomotive industry and railroads,
Charles Kettering's standa ized diesel locomotive can be considered
dominant product designs.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that the
appearance of the dominant design induces a large degree of product
standardization throughout the industry, as a competitive reaction.
Once a dominant product design has been accepted, the rate of product
innovation falls and changes become incremental. Periodically, entire
product lines get redesigned to improve functional performance. The
impact of a dominant design decreases product line diversity as well.
In part because the appearance of a dominant design facilitates cost
competition as well as performance competition, the frequency of
production process innovation (to cut costs) rises as the frequency of
product innovation falls. Through increases in product standardization,
demand for the product, and market stability, the production process can
be further "rationalized". The production process configuration becomes
a line-flow (i.e., assembly line) one. Special-purpose machinery is
developed to eliminate production bottlenecks. Work is further
de-skilled, now only requiring the manual dexterity of an operative. (An
automobile assembly line before robotics is a good image of this
stage.) As volume increases, the productive unit tends to subdivide into
more homogenous units.
With the growth of and standardization in the industry, supplier
networks develop to provide specialized material and capital inputs.
Competition between suppliers encourages innovation in factor goods as
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well.
In large part because of the high frequency of process innovations
induced by competitive pressures to reduce costs, the appearance of a
dominant design is usually followed by a drastic reduction in production
costs. Unit costs of incandescent light bulbs have fallen 80% since
their introduction; costs of the Model T fell a similar percentage.
Similar dramatic reductions have been observed for semiconductors,
computer core memories, and TV picture tubes. In addition to process
innovation, the decline in costs can also be attributed to movement along
a learning curve for use of existing production technology.
Productive units in stage 3 often build up their product research and
development efforts. In the earlier stages, market needs are too
undefined to make large R & D expenditures seem worthwhile; users provide
much of the input in early product development. However, as a stable
market grows for a standardized product, firms set up formal R & D units
to exploit technological opportunities. This has occured in the
automobile, bicycle, food, and mining industries, for example. Thus,
though the frequency of product innovation falls in stage 3, incremental
changes continue.
In the late transition and specific stages, competing products within
a particular market become more and more standardized with successive
refinements, although product differentiation may be developed to appeal
to different market segments. Now, the competitive emphasis is on
reducing costs and ensuring product quality. Both goals are pursued
through process technological change, for the most part. Increasingly,
process innovations come from the supply firms set up to meet the needs
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of the productive unit. Through innovation, the production process
becomes further rationalized. In stage 4, assembly-line tasks become
combined in "islands of automation". In the the specific stage,
automation increases to the point where all or almost all manufacturing
work is done by machine (what the authors call "continuous or
near-continuous flow") -- the predominant tasks are equipment monitoring
and the predominant skills are process maintenance and repair. "By
linking equipment in this manner, ... it becomes highly specialized to a
particular product design. The effect is to link product and process so
that both are costly to change, but highly efficient." 15
In these later stages, a firm is "composed of tightly balanced
homogenous operations and organized in (productive) units synonymous with
product components (engine plants, rolling mills for sheet steel ,
body-building lines and so forth)."16 Other products associated with
these stages are light bulbs and refined gasoline.
In order to gain economies of scale and predictability of supply,
firms in the later stages often seek control over supply sources through
backwards integration. Methods for this are merger, new facility
construction, acquisition, and long-term contract.
As a productive unit evolves, the means for organizational control
tend to mirror changes in the production process. While organizations in
the fluid and early transition stages tend to be flexible, those in later
stages tend to be "bureaucratic, vertically integrated, and
hierarchically organized."17
After the large investment in a rigid, capital-intensive system
geared to one product, the productive unit becomes dependent on a
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constant and high-level demand for its current product. Product and
process innovations which would significantly disrupt the current process
system are not pursued. Because the process is integrated, change is too
costly. R & D expenditures fall off. The firm is vulnerable to "changed
demand, technical obsolescence, and the need to maintain production
volume to cover fixed costs." 18
The authors take pains to point out that they see evolution along the
model as neither inevitable nor beneficial. Some industries may never
reach the specific stage. Reversal of movement is not ruled out. In
Abernathy's study of the automobile industry, he found that reverse
transitions in product development sometimes occur. For example, because
of a significant product innovation, the Ford auto engine in the 1920's
moved from being a stage 4 product (The Model T engine) to a stage 2
product (The Model A engine). However, the product cannot revert to a
stage much earlier than the stage of the production process or the
product and process will not be compatible. Furthermore, the more
capital-intensive the process is, the more costly and difficult process
reversal becomes. So, production processes in the middle and late stages
limit product reverse transitions. 19
Key Themes of the Model
Looking at the model as a whole, there are a number of major themes
running through it which need to be drawn out (some are implicit) and
extended for the purposes of this paper. First, the nature of the
competitive pressures on the productive unit shifts from competition on
product performance to competition on cost as the unit evolves through
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the model .
Secondly, in terms of Chapter II, one can see that productive units
trade off dynamic efficiency for static efficiency as they progress
through the model . In the fluid state, competition is on developing
products with higher performance (dynamic efficiency); the flexible
production process allows the product innovations to be quickly realized
in production. But the production process itself is purposely
inefficient in the static sense. As the product is standardized, dynamic
efficiency comes from process innovation--but the basic standardization
in the process of combining inputs results in higher static efficiency.
Finally, as the product is further standardized and the process becomes
rigid and capital-intensive, managerial efforts go toward maintaining
high static efficiency; the degree of dynamic efficiency is low as
innovations come in small increments. In Abernathy and Utterback's
words, "The implication is that a given productive unit cannot respond
well to all types of demands. It cannot be both highly efficient and
support a high rate of innovation." 20
Thirdly, once a dominant design is adopted, there is some form of
implicit industry-wide standardization. We can assume this may or may
not be made explicit by a standards-writing body. Fourthly, the
frequency of product innovation is negatively related to the existence of
a dominant design, and positively related to production-process
fluidity. The determinants of process technological change are the
degree of product standardization, the size of the market, and market
certainty and stability. As process technogical change occurs, the
process becomes less fluid, and so more expensive to alter--this impacts
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on the unit's ability to afford to implement product innovations.
Finally, though the author never says it directly, the model carries
a tendency towards oligopoly as the market expands. There is the
implication that in most industries the potential exists for process
innovations which generate large economies of scale, and that large
production runs are required to generate these economies; the inescapable
conclusion one must draw is that the number of firms in the industry in
the later stages is smaller rather than larger. There is also the
implication that barriers to entry rise as the production process moves
to higher stages. This is particularly so for new firms which want to
replicate the dominant design; firms which want to challenge the dominant
design with an innovative product perhaps can rely less on capital
intensity and economies of scale, and be successful with a more fluid
production process.
Criticisms of the Abernathy-Utterback Model
In order to determine the appropriate chronological points in product
development for the promulgation of products standards, we need a model
of the sequential patterns of innovation. As such, the
Abernathy-Utterback model is clearly very useful for the purposes of this
paper. However, there are several criticisms which can be made of it,
though few enough to keep it worthwhile for our use.
First of all , the relationship between the productive unit and the
firm is not made clear. The model implies that innovation takes place
within the productive unit -- this may or may not be true. It would seem
that the productive unit is the site of the implementation of policy and
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learning that may go on elsewhere. It is both the instrument of and
constraint on firm policy. As such, it is still a useful unit of
analysis in that it reflects firm policy, innovation and constraints.
Secondly, one wonders somewhat about the generalizability of the job
shop-stage of the model for today's new products. Perhaps in most of the
case studies the authors reviewed, new products were first produced in
job shops. However, it seems that many new products today are first
produced at stage 2, e.g., word processors and video cassette recorders.
There still are recent new products that were first made in job shops,
e.g., solar cells and gene mutations. Perhaps a distinction needs to be
made between incrementally new products and radically new products. The
distinction between the two is twofold. Incrementally new products are
forthright extensions of existing technology and have sizable (though
still small) markets with knowledgeable and not particularly resistant
customers. These customers can see how the new product is an extension
of products they are already familiar with. For example, a videocasette
recorder combines the functions of a TV set and a tape deck. Yet it is
clearly a new product, not a differentation of an existing one.
Radically new products are not linear extensions of existing technology,
and face small , uncertain, unstable markets; most of the potential
customers neither understand the possible benefits of the new technology,
nor how it operates. Because the incrementally new products face larger
and more certain markets, and their technological direction is clear,
they can begin production in a higher stage. The radically new products
still begin in the job shop.
Having made some criticisms of the model , this chapter will concern
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itself with three more topics: 1) the relationship of the discussion in
Chapter II on market structure and dynamic efficiency to the
Abernathy-Utterback model; 2) James Utterback's findings regarding an
established production unit's response to the "technological invasion" of
its product market by production units offering innovative products and
3) the application of the Abernathy-Utterback model to an industry, as we
are concerned with industry-wide standards.
Chapter II Revisited: the Relationship between Market Structure and
Dynamic Efficiency
One can now see that the discussion in Chapter II regarding the
relationship between market structure and innovation fits well with the
Abernathy-Utterback model. It was suggested that in fields of high
technological opportunity, a large number of firms will be most conducive
to product innovation because of the large potential for profits steming
from innovation, and the related large profit uncertainty. This
situation corresponds to the stages in the Abernathy-Utterback model
before the acceptance of a dominant design. With dominant design comes
the process innovations which produce the economies of scale, and which
in turn induce a reduction in the number of firms which can viably
compete in the industry. Scherer suggested that in fields of low
technological opportunity, product innovations tend to come from
concentrated market structures. Again there is a correspondence with the
Abernathy-Utterback model because in the post-dominant design stages, the
industry is concentrated and has become one of low technological
opportunity -- product innovations are incremental. In a situation where
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much of the technology has been exploited and competition is mainly over
cost, a large market share is needed to pay off research and development
expenditures in the face of the modest per-unit profit potential of
innovation.
Extension of the Model -- A General Pattern of Response to Technological
Invasion
In Abernathy and Utterback's model, the productive unit is presented
in isolation of competing industries in its later stages. one would
guess that because the model was presented in a book on the automotive
industry, the authors did not think it appropriate to deal with the
"technological invasion" of an older industry by a new industry
manufacturing a product with a similar purpose, but with a different and
innovative technological base. However, consideration of this situation
is important for our purposes if we wish to think about standard-setting
when an older and a newer industry conflict.
In a paper presented before the American Chemical Society and
Industrial Research Institute Symposium on Innovation in Industry, James
Utterback claims that the technological invasion of mature industries is
more the general rule than the exception.21 Examples include
"electronic calculators replacing electro-mechanical calculators,
transistors replacing vacuum tubes, jet engines replacing piston driven
engines in aircraft, and diesel electric locomotives replacing steam
locomotives..."22 Other examples: "...the replacement of manual
typewriters by electric typewriters, synthetic fibers displacing natural
fibers, celluloid roll film replacing gelatin plates in photography...,
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(and) gas lamps replaced first by carbon filament incandescent lights,
later by tungsten filaments and still later by fluorescent
lighting." 23
Radically new products tend to be developed not be the established
firms, but by users, by small new entrepreneurs, and by larger firms
diversifying into new markets:
Usually a radical innovation originates outside the recognized
set of competing units in a industry. Small new ventures, or larger
firms entering a new business, introduce a disproportionate share of
the innovations which create major threats and conversely
opportunities. There are many reasons why new entrants as opposed to
firms with an existing stake in a business should be expected to be
major innovators. The rewards may be greater to the entering firm
which views the innovation as opening a new market rather than as a
substitute for an existing product. The established firm may view
rewards to be obtained from improvement of the existing technology as
more attractive, because given the high volume of production of
existing lines, return on investment in improvements can be high,
rapidly realized, and relatively certain. By entering the new
technology, an existing firm may substitute for its own products,
thus reducing the benefits to be gained. In markets with relatively
stable demand an innovation may even lower total revenues.
Established firms are faced with choosing among massive investment in
new equipment which will result in stable or declining sales,
modifications of current products which can be built with existing
equipment, price cutting or exit from business. But the new firm
without an existing stake sees the innovative product as a means for
market penetration and rapid expansion.
Established firms are ordinarily highly sophisticated and
capable in technical terms. In almost every instance of an invasion
studied, existing firms had considered and tried the new technology
earlier themselves, or at the same time that invading firms were
developing it and rejected it for a number of reasons. While
economic arguments may reinforce perceptions and organizational
influences, the latter must be governing in most cases. The
established business may be growing moderately or strongly. Peoples'
careers in the organization have been built on a subtle understanding
and long contribution to the development of the established
business. Ways to improve the old may be clearly seen while the
potentials in the new are much more difficult to comprehend either by
the established firms or invading firms. The returns to the old will
be quick and sure and spread over a large production volume, while
the early gains in the new technology will be slow in coming and
difficult. Most importantly, the established firm will tend to view
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the new technology simply as a substitute of the old, and it is
objectively a poor substitute at first. Its real potential to
broaden the base of the technology and market may well be hidden at
first and may develop in completely surprising and unexpected ways
as users experjment with it in various applications and
combinations.2
With regard to economic influences, the Abernathy-Utterback model
also points out that the high cost to the established firm of retooling a
large, capital-intensive production process is another factor which
inhibits major product innovation. Concerning the organization itself,
the structure and the managers in the established firms are usually
chosen to achieve high static efficiency; they are not intended to
successfully handle competitive pressures to be dynamically efficient.
The normal response of the established firms to technological
invasion is to push for new levels of performance and quality for their
existing product line. Innovations occured in the gelatin plate
industry, the steam locomotive industry, the natural fibers industry, and
the icebox industry in reaction to threatening radical innovations.
Usually though, such competitive reactions are not enough and the
established firms are either forced to exit the business or must accept a
greatly reduced market.
In some product lines, the last few firms in the establised
technology can be highly successful and profitable and even highly
innovative. There will probably always be a demand for fine
mechanical watches, and perhaps the few firms that survive the
present shakeout in the industry will be highly profitable and stable
companies. And the few firms which remain manufacturing vacuum
tubes, probably supply a higher specialized and profitable market for
high performage designs, research and other specialized
applications.
Periodically, the innovative response of the firms relying on the old
technology may be so strong as to give the new technology a run for its
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money. Aluminum engine blocks appeared likely to capture a major part of
the market prior to the introduction of thin-walled cast iron engine
blocks in response. The Gar mantle was invented after Edison's
incandescent lamp and it was a strong competitor for a time. 26
In sum, there is a general tendency for established firms not to be
major innovators because of 1) economic considerations -- the
availability of certain, substantial short-term profits from selling the
established product versus massive retooling of production lines, and
less certain and likely smaller profits, and 2) organizational influences
-- managers in the established firm have significant personal investment
in the existing product, the potential of the new product is unknown, and
the established firm tends to be set up for static rather than
dynamic efficiency. Thus, the appearance of radical innovations which
replace older, established products, tends to start the sequence of the
Abernathy-Utterback model over again.
The Application of the Abernathy-Utterback Model to an Industry
The Abernathy-Utterback model was developed to describe the evolution
of the characteristics of one productive unit. As was discussed earlier,
the productive unit can be seen as a reflection of firm policy and
constraints. For the purposes of this paper, however, we need a model of
the evolution of an industry over time, because the types of product
standards we will be looking at are industry-wide. In Chapter VI, we
will use the Abernathy-Utterback model for this purpose. In this
section, we provide a definition of an "industry" and highlight how the
Abernathy-Utterback model will later be used to look at one. The reader
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can keep these in mind as he reads Chapters IV and V.
We will define an "industry" as a group of firms producing products
with the same basic function and technological base. The products may
vary in quality, cost, and ancillary functions. What constitutes a group
of products with a common function and technological base is an arbitrary
determination. For our purposes, that determination is made by the firms
and professionals who get together to write standards. The standards for
gas-powered refrigerators are made by people different from those writing
standards for electric refrigerators. Thus, there are two refrigerator
industries. Of course, standards-writing groups do not immediately
emerge for all radically new products, though perhaps they may for
incrementally new products.
Distinctions can be made between industries which produce
components/material inputs (used in the manufacture of some final good),
those which produce capital inputs (manufacturing equipment), and those
which produce final goods (to be used for non-manufacturing purposes).
Buyers of final goods may be households or institutions, including
other firms. For example, typewriters bought by advertising agencies are
considered here to be final goods. The labelling of industries by type
of product is somewhat arbitrarily done. One group of firms can make all
three types of goods. For the purposes of this paper, if a group of
firms manufactures inputs primarily to supply itself for the production
of a common final good, the industry is defined by that final good.
For the succeeding analysis in this paper, it will be assumed that
the "industry's" good is a final one. Final goods serve a diverse
market, whereas material and capital inputs tend to serve narrow ones.
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Standards development in the latter markets is generally dictated by the
nature of the users' products -- innovation of inputs is technologically
constrained by the nature of the final good. This situation is not
particularly interesting. On the other hand, the development of final
goods is less technologically constrained by users' needs, since they are
not embodied in specific products. This characteristic, plus the
existence of diverse users, makes the analysis of standards development
more interesting. Choosing one type of good simplifies the analysis --
the points to be made about standards for final products are relevant for
inputs as well.
Further, the "industry's" product is assumed not to be definitionally
standardized, but one for "which multiple inputs are combined and
transferred through a complex production process that yields a highly
valued product whose characteristics may be varied." 27
With regard to the extension of the Abernathy-Utterback model to an
industry in Chapter VI, a number of clarifying assumptions will be made
in order to keep the analysis manageable. It will be assumed that all
firms' products are concurrently moving through the same stages of the
Abernathy-Utterback model, and there are no major technological
differences between them. It also will be assumed that most firms move
through the process stages concurrently as well -- firms supplying a
similar product made in a different process stage are either pursuing
product differentiation (and are assumed to be out of the industry) or
are non-competitive and will soon be out of business. Reverse
transitions for a product may take place, but are constrained by the
degree to which process reversal may occur -- in the middle and late
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stages, the production process essentially cannot revert. The industry may
compete with a more established industry in its infancy and a younger
industry in its maturity.
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CHAPTER IV. AN EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY
In Chapter II, we identified three types of economic efficiency:
1) firm dynamic efficiency--a measure of the extent to which the
firm, through product and process innovation, is extending the
societal production-possibility curve and/or changing the
compositi'on of the curve so as to increase utility.
2) firm static efficiency--a measure of the extent to which the
firm is able to minimize production costs based on initial
conditions, i.e. existing knowledge.
3) marketplace efficiency--a static measure of the efficiency of
interaction between buyers and sellers, i.e. the extent to which
prices represent the outcome of perfect competition,
externalities are internalized in prices, all information
regarding the product and substitutes is available, and public
goods are absent from the marketplace.
The concept of economic efficiency brings with it the concept of
economic inefficiency, a situation where the potential for efficiency is
not being met. If we can understand the nature of the inefficiency, we
can label it, in light of the above definitions, as a dynamic
inefficiency (e.g., unmet potential for innovation), a static
inefficiency (e.g., non-cost-minimizing choice of production process), or
a marketplace inefficiency (e.g., poor information). These three labels
will be called types of inefficiency. If significant static and dynamic
inefficiency exists over time, it is only because marketplace
inefficiencies exist. If the marketplace were efficient, inefficient
firms would be driven out of business.
Inefficiencies, however labelled, come from one or several sources,
e.g., one source of inefficient prices may be lack of accurate product
information. The purpose of this section is to identify potential
sources of economic inefficiency as productive units in an industry move
through the Abernathy-Utterback model, and label these sources by type of
42
inefficiency. This will provide the framework for the discussion in
Chapter VI of the economic role of industrywide voluntary product
standards.
As was said in Chapter III, we will assume that the productive unit's
product is a final good, and is not definitionally standardized. To
facilitate the discussion of economic inefficiencies, we will define four
types of actors which interact with the productive unit. On the supply
side are the suppliers of financial capital to the productive unit
(investors/lenders), technology developers (product and process), and
factor producers. Investors/lenders, technology developers and factor
producers may or may not belong to the same firm as the productive
unit. Product buyers are the demand-side actors. Their demand may
be intermediate or final. It will be assumed that the product is not
"sold" to another unit of the firm, but has to compete in the
marketplace. Because decision-making authority regarding product and
process in a multi-unit firm may be divided between the productive unit
and the firm, for the purposes of simplicity it will be assumed decisions
are made by the firm and reflected in the productive unit.
To simplify matters, the main body of the discussion below will
assume that the industry, in its later stages, is not invaded by a
younger industry making a product with an innovative technological base.
This assumption will be relaxed at the end of the chapter.
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Market Uncertainty
Market uncertainty is a firm's uncertainty regarding its answer to
the question: "In order to maximize profits in this industry, what type
of product should we produce and how much?" Market uncertainty is always
in existence to some degree, but particularly in the pre-dominant design
stages when the product is quickly evolving and the market for the
product is unsettled. In the early stages, the firm needs to make
choices regarding both product development goals and size of production
process investment. Uncertainty is acute regarding the future nature of
the product (i.e., the dominant design-to-be), current and future demand
for and production costs of the product, and the future demand for and
nature, supply and prices of substitutes. In addition, market
uncertainty exists because consumers do not yet possess "full information
about prices and quality differentials of all available alternatives, and
therefore their adjustments are gradual and not instantaneous." 2
As a result, the firm and associated technology developers,
investors/lenders, and factor producers will slow down their rate of
investment in product and process development and manufacturing capacity
as they attempt to gather information.
When uncertainties are significant, acquisition of information
is called for before decision-making takes place. Firms utilize
market studies and engineering cost estimates to reduce uncertainty.
Rules of thumb which have worked previously, such as "learning
curves" and "product life cycle," will be utilized in same
instances. But given bounded rationality, acquisition of full
information is not possible. And since costs of making a "wrong" (ex
post) decision are substantial , firms will tend to utilize an
adaptive, sequential decision-making process.
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This is of particular importance with respect to firms'
investment decisions on plant and equipment designed to attain the
long-run minimum costs of production. Given production
uncertainties, the optimal scale of plant will not be attempted at
once. Since the market is the final arbiter of whether an investment
decision is profitable, actual market tests will be utilized. Pilot
plants and initial attempts at market penetration are needed. Firms,
if risk-averse, will not seek rapid attainment of scile economies,
but rather will respond gradually to market signals.
The result of market uncertainty in the early stages is a loss both
in dynamic and static efficiency. Product development and capacity
building which would generate scale economies are slowed. Static
inefficiency may also result if guesses about approximate volume and
capacity are incorrect, and so resources are inefficiently utilized. In
the later stages, when the product is fairly homogenized and "mature",
market uncertainty revolves more around the single question of "how
much?". Uncertainty regarding present and future demand can result in
static efficiency losses if production runs and capacity investment are
inappropriate to actual demand.
Market uncertainty can also be a source of marketplace inefficiency.
Even though technological knowledge is assumed to be static when
marketplace inefficiency is considered, a lack of understanding by firms
in an industry regarding what current possible product variations buyers
desire can result in a less-than-optimal exchange. This lack of
information by producers needs to be widespread to affect marketplace
efficiency -- if some producers have accurate knowledge and some do not,
marketplace efficiency will be maintained if buyers flock to the
producers where products better meet their needs. Situations of
widespread lack of understanding of consumer desires tend to occur when
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buyers' and sellers' experience with a particular type of product is new,
i.e. in the early stages of the Abernathy-Utterback model.
Techological Uncertainty
--Product
For any desired, but undeveloped, product, there exists several
alternative technolgical paths/designs which a firm could pursue.
Product technological uncertainty is uncertainty regarding the list of
the possible technological options, the feasibility of the various
options, their respective development costs and time, and the ultimate
relative performance of each option. Uncertainty about relative
performance relates to market uncertainty--a firm cannot be sure that it
will choose one path and successfully develop a product only to find that
a competition has produced a better one.
In the pre-dominant design stages, product technology is unsettled
and experience with the technology is minimal, so technological
uncertainty is high. Coupled with the high degree of market uncertainty
in this period, the effect is to raise investment risk, and slow down
investment in product development. Adaptive sequential decision-making
is adopted. In nascent, high-risk industries where large amounts of
investment capital are needed (e.g., photovoltaics), the two types of
uncertainty may result in the majority of investment being undertaken in
subsidiaries of large, well-financed firms successful in other older
industries (e.g., oil companies). Such restrictions could have
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anti-competitive results (marketplace inefficiency).
After a dominant design is accepted, the basic form of the product is
stable for a longer period of time; in the short-run only incremental
innovations are pursued. The product technology itself is better
understood. Product technological uncertainty will likely be lessened as
a result of these two factors. Further, with greatly increased market
certainty better estimates can be made of the investment risk in pursuing
product technological change, and so research and development is more
likely to be pursued.
--Process
Process technological uncertainties exist as well. In the early
stages, producers seek flexible process arrangements so any process
uncertainties are unimportant. However, once a firm begins planning for
mass production, particularly if a dominant design has not yet been
accepted, it faces significant process technological uncertainties, i.e.
uncertainty regarding the feasibility of various process options, their
respective development costs and time, and the relative performance of
each option. While process technological uncertainties peak in the stage
2-3 period, they exist afterwards to significant degree, as long as
frequent process changes are taking place. Abernathy and Utterback make
the point that in the later stages, process innovations tend to be
developed outside the firm producing the good. External developers of
process technologies will also have product technological uncertainty, as
their product is process innovations.
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Public Good Nature of Technical Information
Technical information which is embodied within a product may be
called a public good if competing technology developers and producers can
gain the information through examination of the product. Such
information is called a public good because 1) one person may utilize the
information without diminishing its intrinsic usefulness to another
person, and 2) preventing people from obtaining and using the information
is difficult. Because of the public good nature of technical
information, a technology development firm or producer firm may find that
information on which it spent significant resources developing is being
utilized by other firms at little cost to them and with no financial
remuneration to the originator. As an example, semiconductor
manufacturers often strip down rival manufacturers' new products to copy
the newly developed technology. 4
Because of the public good nature of technical information,
technology developers may decide to restrict the use of new information
through patents and licensing. Such restriction could result in one or a
few firms dominating an industry--a potential marketplace inefficiency.
On the other hand, patents and licensing can spur competition to further
innovation.
Further, if technology developers and producers believe that
competing firms cannot be prevented from utilizing new information
despite patents, they may decide to decrease their investment in research
and development, a reduction in dynamic efficiency.
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Inefficient Market Structure
In Chapter II, it was noted that market structure has an effect on
both marketplace and dynamic efficiency. Specifically, it was posited
that less concentration increases marketplace efficiency and stimulates
product innovation in fields of high technological opportunities, and
some concentration stimulates product innovation in fields of medium and
low technological opportunity. In Chapter III, it was suggested that the
degree of technological opportunity in a field tends to decrease as an
industry's productive units move through the stages of the
Abernathy-Utterback model. Process innovations were said to be generated
by profit uncertainty, a function of the degree of effective competition,
in turn in part a function of number of competing firms. However, a
greater concentration of firms may be needed to exploit the process
innovations, to reap the economies of scale.
A desired market structure is one which maximizes the net benefits of
competitive pricing, economies of scale, and product innovations.
Present market structure has an impact on present pricing and economies
of scale, and on future benefits of all three kinds. Different market
structures will result in different levels of present and future
benefits. Society has some time preference regarding benefits, generally
valuing certain positive impacts in the present somewhat more than equal
impacts in the future. Taking into account society's time preference of
benefits, certain market structures will have higher overall net benefits
than others. A market structure is considered inefficient if a change in
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the market structure will bring greater net benefits.
While a large number of rivals may mean greater marketplace
efficiency at any stage, it seems the nuber of rivals conducive to
dynamic efficiency falls as the industry evolves through the stages. In
the early stages, low concentration tends to be conducive both to
marketplace and dynamic efficiency; high concentration tends to be
inefficient. In the later stages, there appears to be some tradeoff
between dynamic and marketplace efficiency as some concentration is
helpful to the former but harmful to the later. Because society may be
willing to trade off some present competitive pricing benefits for future
dynamic efficiency benefits, there may be several efficient market
structures in the later stages. Market structures which do not offer
maximum net benefits also may occur. With too little concentration, the
dynamic efficiency losses (relative to an efficient structure) outweigh
the consumer surplus gains; with too much concentration, the consumer
surplus losses (relative to an efficient structure) are greater than any
additional economies of scale and product innovation benefits.
The Nature of the Production Process
To the extent that the production process is kept flexible to
accomodate product innovation, static efficiency is lost. Conversely, to
the extent that the production process is made rigid to generate product
volume and economies of scale, and potential product innovations are not
pursued because of the costliness of overhauling the process
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configuration, dynamic efficiency is lost. In the Abernathy-Utterback
model , the static efficiency losses occur in the early stages, and the
dynamic efficiency losses in the later ones.
Management Orientation
The management skills needed to operate a firm when competition
requires a high degree of dynamic efficiency are quite different than
those in a competitive situation calling for a high degree of static
efficiency. The former emphasizes flexibility, adaptiveness, and an
ability to work in the face of the unknown; the latter emphasizes a
predeliction for detail, ability to work in a hierarchy, and a
technocratic orientation. Burton Klein basically sees the difference in
another way:
If it is granted that the pursuit of dynamic efficiency requires
dealing with more uncertainty than does the pursuit of static
efficiency, and that people differ in their capacity to deal with
uncertainty, then we should expect to observe a division of labor
between firms engaged in dealing with more or less uncertainty. 6
If firms (or rather the individuals within firms) specialize in one
orientation or the other, there will be instances that managers in firms
in the early stages of the Abernathy-Utterback model will miss
opportunities to increase static efficiency without sacrificing dynamic
efficiency. Similarly, managers in firms in the later stages may miss
opportunities to increase dynamic efficiency through product innovation
that would provide greater benefit to the firm, despite possible losses
in static efficiency, then would sticking with the existing product.
This latter point relates to the discussion in Chapter III of James
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Utterback's ideas that established firms tend not to develop major
product innovations primarily because of the strong orientation of the
managers and organizational structure to producing and selling the
establ i shed product.
Klein paints a picture of the effects of a static orientation(in the
days before a 20% Japanese share of the U.S. auto market):
There are Ford and Chrysler engineers who complain bitterly that
while they are permitted to undertake some research-and-development
projects to prevent General Motors from obtaining a lead, they are
seldom permitted to undertake projects that would enable their
companies to obtain a significant lead. Why are engineers from these
companies so highly constrained? The reason is that what is rational
behavior from a creative engineer's point of view is not necessarily
rational behavior from the point of view of the Ford and Chrysler top
management. Because the firms in question are optimized to deal with
a low degree of uncertainty, they dare no impose risks upon their
competition to which they cannot respond.
Buyer Uncertainties
In the stagesbefore dominant designwith rapid product evolution and
existing products which are not standardized across the industry, buyers
are often faced with incomplete product-related information in a number
of categories. Often, the information exists but is not easily
accessible because of product diversity and constant change, and lack of
mass market experience; other times, the information concerns the future
and cannot be known until then. In any case, buyer uncertainties are a
source of marketplace inefficiency.
There are three major categories of buyer uncertainties. Performance
uncertainties are uncertainties about the level of product quality, and
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compatibility with the product's technological environment. Product
quality characteristics are output/outcome, efficiency, reliability,
durability, and health/environmental effects. (These characteristics will
be defined in Chapter V.) When a new product appears on the market,
potential buyers have a relatively high uncertainty regarding product
performance until they begin to hear feedback from reliable sources
(e.g., other firms, Consumer Reports, friends), but it takes time and
market growth for reliable feedback to become available.
Support uncertainties are uncertainties regarding the availability
and reliability of a support infrastructure for helping the buyer with
product installation, operation, maintenance and repair. For instance,
foreign cars initially did not sell as well as they could have in the
U.S. in the 1950's and 60's because many potential buyers were unsure if
they could easily obtain reliable support services.
Cost uncertainties take several forms. Buyers are often not sure of
the money and time and effort costs the product will require in terms of
installation, operation, maintenance, and repairs. These cost
uncertainties are in part related to performance uncertainties--the buyer
lacks complete information regarding the frequency and intensity of
quality problems. In addition, he lacks complete information regarding
the costs of fixing any particular quality problem.
Opportunity cost uncertainties are another form of cost
uncertainties. The lack of performance certainty regarding the diverse
product choices in the early stages makes it difficult for buyers to
compare products on the basis of quality-adjusted price. Further,
because the product is rapidly evolving, buyers cannot be certain of the
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performance characteristics of future product offerings, and thus whether
it is better to buy now or later.
Though they always exist to some degree, uncertainties held by buyers
tend to diminish as the product evolves through the Abernathy-Utterback
model. Once a dominant design is accepted, product offerings of
different firms are more easily compared. Product stabilization and the
development of an experienced mass market facilitates the development and
institutionalization of easily accessible sources of information on
production performance.
Excessive Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are considered here to be the time, money and
effort spent by buyers in searching and arranging the transportation for
a product. Costs of finding out information regarding the product itself
are discussed in the section on buyer uncertainty. While a large degree
of product differentiation in terms of quality, dimension of size or
output, and compatibility with other products may offer buyers the
benefits of a wide choice, it also may involve higher transaction costs.
Because sellers may not carry all the varieties of a product, a specific
variation of a product may be harder to find, and may need to be
transported over a larger distace than with more product
standardization.
Product differentiation is considered optimal if the transaction
costs of greater differentiation exceed the benefits of greater choice.
If, in these terms, too much product differentiation exists, the
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transaction costs are considered excessive and are a source of
marketplace inefficiency.
External ities
Negative externalities are costs, resulting from the manufacture and
use of a good, which are incurred by persons other than the buyer and
seller and not internalized in the market price of the good. They are
marketplace inefficiencies. Examples of negative externalities are air,
water, and noise pollution, and injuries to third parties resulting from
product use. Potentially, negative externalities can occur anywhere
along the Abernathy-Utterback model.
Positive externalities are benefits to third parties which are not
included in the market price. If one firm trains a worker who then
leaves for another firm, the benefit of his training is a positive
externality for the second firm. The public good nature of technical
information is one type of positive externality.
The Relationship between the Sources of Economic Inefficiency and the
Stages of the Abernathy-Utterback Model
The discussion above has identified nine major sources of
inefficiency, described each in terms of the types of inefficiency
(dynamic, static, marketplace) it encourages, and the stages in the
Abernathy-Utterback model where it tends to be prominent. Table 2
presents one way of looking at the relationship between stages, types of
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TABLE 2. Significant Sources of Each Type of Economic Inefficiency by
Stage of the Abernathy-Utterback Model--for Firms in A Single
Industry
Stages of Abernathy-Utterback Model
1 2 3 4 5
Sources of Firm Dynamic Inefficiency
Market Uncertainty X X X
Technological Uncertainty X X X 0 0
Public Good Nature of
Technical Information 0 0 0 0 0
Inefficient Market Structure 0 0 0 0 0
Nature of Production Process
Required X X X
Narrow Management Focus X X X
Sources of Firm Static Inefficiency:
Market Uncertainty X X X
Nature of Production Process
Required X X
Narrow Management Focus 0 0 0
Sources of Marketplace Inefficiency:
Market Uncertainty X X X
Buyer Uncertainty X X X 0 0
Inefficient Market Structure 0 0 0 0 0
Negative Externalities 0 0 0 0 0
Excessive Transaction Costs 0 0 0
KEY:
X A stage when a source of inefficiency will most likely appear, as is
inherent to the model.
0 A stage where a source of inefficiency ma appear, depending on the
nature of the industry's product, structure and management.
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inefficiency, and sources of inefficiency. (Remember it is assumed firms
in an industry move together through the stages of the model.) In the
table, X's are used for sources of inefficiency whose appearance at the
designated stages is inherent in the Abernathy-Utterback model , that is,
in some sense the sources are a function of technological considerations
that occur across almost all industries. The "0's" in the table are used
for sources of inefficiency which may appear at certain stages to
exacerbate a certain type of inefficiency because of the specific nature
of an industry's structure, product, or management.
The placement of X's and O's is somewhat arbitrary. While some
degree of each source of inefficiency appears in all stages, we are
interested in the stages where the sources are a significant problem. In
an abstract model, where significance ends or begins is a judgment call.
The earlier discussion in this chapter attempted to point out in what
stages the sources tend to appear as significant problems.
Of the sources of inefficiency inherent in the Abernathy-Utterback
model (the X's), the table shows all but two appearing primarily in the
early stages (1-3). Market uncertainty is a source of all three types of
inefficiency in the early stages. It slows investment in innovation and
inhibits the use of efficient, high-volume production and equipment; that
producers are not clear what consumers want results in marketplace
inefficiency as well . Technological uncertainty also slows the
development of innovations (product and process) in the early stages.
Buyer uncertainty is clearly a source of marketplace inefficiency in the
early stages - consumers lack information regarding product performance
and ownership costs with which to compare existing and future product
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variations. Finally, a flexible productive process required in the early
stages by competitive pressures means producers are consciously choosing
to reduce static efficiency to gain the fluidity to be dynamically
efficient.
The tw sources of inefficiency in the later stages of the model
reflect established firms' tendency to seek static efficiency at the
expense of dynamic efficiency. First, because competition in the later
stages is over cost, firms need a capital-intensive production pocess
which yields high economies of scale. However, capital-intensive
processes often make process and product innovation, in the short-run,
not economically worthwhile. Second, a management narrowly focused on
static efficiency and short-term profits will reject, not comprehend, or
not have the skills to fully exploit possibilities for major product
innovation. As Utterback points out, "(w)hile economic arguments may
reinforce perceptions and organizational influences, the latter must be
governing in most cases." 8
Of the four sources of inefficiency just discussed, three are forms
of informational uncertainty while the fourth is a result of conscious
management decisions to emphasize one form of efficiency over another.
The three forms of uncertainty are related to the same origins - rapid
product evolution, lack of experience with the technology and the market,
and the inability to predict the future (i.e., what new and better forms
of the product will appear). Market uncertainty is also a function of
buyer uncertainty -- if buyers hold back purchases because of lack of
information, producers lose feedback by which they can learn about the
nature of the market.
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The other sources of inefficiency do not inherently occur in the
Abernathy-Utterback model , but may because of the nature of a particular
industry under study. Inefficient market structure may occur at any
point in the model, and constrain both dynamic and marketplace
efficiency. The public good nature of technical information may serve as
a restraint on companies' investment in product innovations (a dynamic
inefficiency) -- this restraint may occur at any stage. The appearance
of negative externalities depends upon the nature of the product, e.g.,
if it can cause harm to third parties uninvolved in the market
transaction . Negative externalities also may occur at any stage.
Excessive transaction costs due to product differentiation tends to
occur in the first three stages -- there is little product
differentiation in stages 4 and 5. Narrow management focus on dynamic
efficiency in the early stages may result in static inefficiencies beyond
those needed to maintain dynamic efficiency; the reverse is the case in
the later stages, where opportunities for dynamic efficiency can be lost
because of too narrow a focus on static efficiency. Finally, consumers
may face high information costs in determining product quality in later
stages if there are no minimum quality standards in force.
Sources of Inefficiency and Technological Invasion
Firms in an established industry (i.e. in the middle and late stages
of the Abernathy-Utterback model) faced with invasion by a younger
industry making a technologically innovative product have several
choices. They can either stick with the established product and not
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venture into the new industry, abandon the established product and begin
making the new one, or hedge their bets by developing a foothold in the
new industry while continuing to manufacture the established product (as
oil companies have done with photovoltaics). It seems likely that
established firms would not enter a new industry and abandon the old
unless the new industry was advanced enough in terms of market size and
short-run profits to make up for the opportunity costs of leaving the old
industry.
It will be assumed that any productive units created by established
firms to manufacture the new product are in the new industry, i.e. not on
the Table 2 matrix for the established firms. For firms which keep
productive units in the established industry, the sources of inefficiency
which tend to appear in a situation of technological invasion are the
same as those appearing in a situation of no invasion. Dynamic
efficiency is held back by narrow management focus and the nature of the
production process required. If market uncertainty appears because of
technological invasion, it is likely to be a spur to product innovation,
as Utterback points out.
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V. THE BASIC TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS OF INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT
STANDARDS
Having discussed the major sources of economic inefficiency, our next
step is to outline the basic technical functions of industrywide
voluntary product standards. In Chapter VI, we will integrate the
analyses of Chapters IV and V to determine the role standards can play in
increasing economic efficiency.
Industrywide voluntary product standards transmit technical
information regarding product development, manufacture and/or use, and
prescribe behavior regarding the use of that information. For instance,
the Paper Stationery and Tablet Manufacturers Association recommends that
typewriter tablets should be 8-1/2 x 11 inches or 8-1/2 x 13. The
technical information transmitted is that of the dimension; the behavior
prescribed is that tablet manufacturers should produce typewriter tablets
in accordance with the technical information.
Standards vary by the nature of the information contained in them.
For instance, some standards define the meaning of words; others specify
the strength of certain materials, and others indicate the appropriate
dimensions of one product so it will fit with another product of
standardized dimensions. The nature of the information in a standard
implies a certain technical outcome, if the information is used as
presented. By technical outcome we mean a result which can be described
in physical terms. For example, definitions indicate the vehicles
(words) by which people will communicate, materials specifications lead
to a built product of a certain strength, and compatibility standards
insure certain goods will fit together.
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After reviewing existing institutional and academic literature on
standards and looking at specific standards themselves, we have
identified six basic types of technical outcomes which standards induce.
One standard may be intended to bring about one or several technical
outcomes. A standard may be described in terms of its technical
function(s), i.e. the type of technical outcome(s) it is supposed to
bring about. Six basic types of standards, each representing one
technical function, are identified and described below -- terminology,
measurement method standards, test method standards, variety reduction
standards, compatability standards, and quality standards. Actual
standards may be a combination of two or more of these types.
It should be noted that the categorization of standards by form (what
they look like) rather than by function (what they do) has been the
normal practice heretofore. For instance, ASTM suggests there are five
types of standards -- definitions, recommended practices, test methods,
classifications, and specifications.2 Although there is some overlap
between the two systems, categorization by form is not particularly
useful for purposes of determining the economic role standards can play.
We seek to understand what economic functions the technical functions of
standards can play.
Terminology
The technical function of terminology is to establish a common
language for products, components, product characteristics, units of
measurement, and patterns of behavior. An example of standard
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terminology is the definition issued by ASTM for the term "vacuum
cleaner":
A system or device that removes material, usually loose, from
surfaces by means of the air flow caused by subatmospheric pressure,
having an intake intended to be moved in proximity to the surface, a
means of separating the material from the air, and a receptacle for
collecting the separated material. The inlet may be fixed or
attached to other eguipment and provision is made for removing
collected material.
Another example is the definition of the "curb weight" of an
automobile, according to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE): "The
total weight of the vehicle including batteries, lubricants, and other
expendable supplies but excluding the driver, passengers, and other
payloads."
A classification system is a systematically related set of
definitions which divide materials, products, or services into discrete
groupings according to certain characteristics, e.g., origin, material
composition, physical properties, or use. One example of a
classification system:
ASTM Committee D-13 on Textiles has devised standard tables
for classifying man-made and natural fibers. Man-made
fibers are listed according to commercial and biological
name, use or staple length, and geographical source. 5
Measurement Method Standards
The technical function of measurement method standards is to
encourage the quantitative measurement of the physical characteristics or
properties of objects in a specified manner. (That the object is
measured in the specified way is the technical outcome.) Measurement
method standards provide a common language for the communication of the
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results of measuring. They may be used in technology development,
production, or in conjunction with other types of standards.
Examples of measurement method standards are "Techniques and
Instrumentation for the Measurement of Potentially Hazardous
Electromagnetic Radiation at Microwave Frequencies" (developed through
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), "Methods of
Measurement of Mercury Lamp Ballasts and Transformers" (developed through
ANSI), "Diesel Smoke Measurement Procedure" (developed by the Society of
Automotive Engineers), and "Instrumentation and Techniques for Exhaust
Gas Emission Measurement" (developed by SAE).
Test Method Standards
A test method standard specifies the procedure for evaluating the
characteristics, properties or performance of a product. (The use of
this procedure is the desired technical outcome.) The standard generally
includes directions regarding apparatus, test conditions, procedures,
observations and calculations. A test method specified by a standard is
often used to determine whether a product meets a particular quality
standard i.e. it will be used in making a judgement of some sort. If the
prescribed procedure includes making certain calculations, it will often
refer -to a measurement method standard.
Examples of test method standards are "Wheel s-Recreational and
Utility Trailer Test Procedures" (SAE), "Brake Lining Quality Control
Test Procedures" (SAE), "Test for Rubber Property--Resilience Using a
Rebound Pendulum" (ASTM), and "Testing Urethane Foam Isocyanate Raw
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Materials" (ASTM).
Compatibility Standards
A compatibility standard specifies the characteristics or properties
that a product shall have in order to be compatible with a conjoint
product. (Compatibility is the desired technical outcome.) An
industrywide compatibility standard allows a product made by one
manufacturer to work with a conjoint product made by another, and the
replacement of either product by similar products of other manufacturers.
Compatibility standards are numerous and their effects are quite
visible in everyday surroundings. Examples of conjoint products which
are compatible industrywide through standardization include "tires and
rims, pipe flanges and fittings, nuts and bolts, shafting pins and
washers, guns and ammunition, records and record players, cameras and
film, flashlights and batteries, bulbs and lamp sockets, even beds and
sheets."6 A product can be standardized to be compatible with
itself. The size of bricks and the gauge of railroad tracks are
standardized for this purpose.
Variety Reduction Standards
A variety reduction standard prescribes a limited and discrete
variety of product characteristics (e.g., physical dimensions, output
levels) in order to achieve lower per-unit production costs (economies of
scale) and/or ease consumer transaction costs in comparison shopping.
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A good example of a variety reduction standard is that for beds,
which have four standard sizes--twin, full, queen, king. Many variety
reduction standards were written by industry associations in the 1920's
in response to the urgings of Herbert Hoover, in his role as president of
the Federated American Engineering Societies and as U.S. Secretary of
Commerce. As examples, product varieties were reduced for clothing,
shotgun shells, paint brushes, bricks, nails, files, lumber, paper, and
business forms during this period. 7
A standard may have a variety reduction function and a compatibility
function at the same time. For example, standard file folder sizes have
a variety reduction function and are compatible with standard sizes of
letters, typing paper and legal pads.
Quality Standards
A quality standard attempts to ensure an acceptable level of product
performance along one or several dimensions. Possible dimensions of
product performance include output/outcome, reliability, durability,
efficiency, and safety/environmental impact. (These terms are defined
below.) Quality standards come in a number of forms--performance
criteria, design criteria, materials specification, recommended
practices. Acceptability is often determined through the use of
measurement and test methods.
We can identify five basic categories of quality standards, one for
each of the possible dimensions of product performance. A standard is
placed in a category according to its specific technical function (which
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may or may not be clear to the layman). Several of these dimensions are
useful labels only for standards of certain kinds of products. While the
dimensions are arbitrary, they do provide a useful way of thinking about
types of quality standards. Often, one standard can be seen fitting in
more than one category.
-- Output/outcome standards
Products which are intended to somehow provide a particular type of
output (e.g., electricity) or outcome (e.g., a clean windshield) are
often manufactured to conform to a quality standard which specifies a
desired level of output or outcome. By "outcome" we mean the product's
impact on or relationship to its environment.
As an example of a standard which specifies a particular level of
output, SAE Recommended Practice J903c (concerning passenger car
windshield wiper systems) states:
The windshield wiper system shall be designed to provide two or
more frequencies. One of the frequencies shall be a minimum of
45 cycles/min. The highest and one lower frequency shall differ
by at least 15 cycleg/min. Such lower frequency shall be at
least 20 cycles/min.b
The minimum speeds are the required outputs, designed to provide the
driver with a particular outcome (visibility).
In a long and complex paragraph, the SAE standard describes the
"minimum windshield wiped area"--this is the identification of a certain
desired outcome. The desired potency of pesticides when sprayed on
certain insects, and the required "time-to-dry" for latex paint are other
examples of outcome standards.
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Sometimes, a standard for output/outcome is stated in terms of design
criteria. This is an example from the standard for gas-fueled
refrigerators: "Nonautomatic ice making systems shall have a minimum ice
storage capacity of 0.4 pound per cubic foot of total refrigerator
storage volume, but not less than 0.5 pound of ice." 9
-- Reliability standards
Reliability is a measure of a product's ability to repeatedly perform
its function in a satisfactory manner, even under adverse conditions. We
use the term "reliability" in connection with products, usually with
working/interacting parts, which are called on to perform their functions
over and over again. Reliability is one measure of how well the
product's components work together.
As an example of a reliability standard, the SAE standard on
windshield wipers states that the two operating frequencies "must be
obtainable under normal vehicle operating conditions regardless of engine
speed and engine load..."10 The American National Standard for
gas-fueled refrigerators says, "Burners shall ignite, operate and
extinguish without objectionable noise under all conditions of test
speci fied herein. "1
-- Durability standards
Durability is a measure of the ability of the component of a product
to physically stand up to time and adverse conditions. Thus, durability
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refers to single-component products and individual components of
multi-component products. Reliability is a measure of the ability of a
multi-component product to perform its function. So, an unreliable
product (a clock) could have a nondurable part (a gear).
Example: The American National Standard for steel valves has a
number of standards aimed at increasing durability. Valves must have a
minimum wall thickness, be able to withstand certain temperatures, be
composed of specified materials, and be repaired by welding in a certain
manner.12  To ensure that rubber surgical gloves will not rip during
operations, they must have a certain tensile strength.13 The
durability of auto windshield wiper systems must be tested through
operation for 1,500,000 cycles (a cycle is one sweep and the return):
"Any component failure, except windshield wiper blade element, during
this test denotes system failure." 1 4
-- Efficiency standards
Efficiency is a measure of 0 product's consumption rate of inputs
required for its operation. Obviously, the term applies only to products
which require inputs.
Examples: The American National Standard for gas-fueled refrigerator
states:
A refrigerator for storage of frozen foods and making ice
shall not require an average input rating of more than 300
Btu per hour for each cubic foot of total storage volume to
maintain a temperature of 15 F. in the ,ompartment when
operating in room temperature of 90 F.1
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The American National Standard for gas-fired duct furnaces requires:
"Duct furnaces shall have a thermal efficiency of at least 75 percent
based on the total heating value of the gas."16
-- Safety/environmental impact standards
The technical function of safety/environmental impact standards is to
safeguard human life and health, and the physical and natural environment
during product use. Safety/environmental impact standards abound in the
literature. In addition to the trade and professional associations,
entire organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association and
Underwriters Laboratory exist to publish and encourage enforcement of
safety/environmental standards. A perusal of standards volumes reveals
safety standards regarding the construction of electric dry bath heaters,
blower and exhaust systems, household electric ranges, vending machines;
and recommended practices regarding the guarding of mechanical power
transmission apparatus, the care and use of grinding machines and lathes,
and the storage of rubber tires. Other examples include standards for
the sterility of rubber gloves, the release of noxious gases from
refrigeration, and the fire-resistance of power transformers.
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CHAPTER VI: THE ROLE OF INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS
IN STIMULATING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Chapter IV set forth the major sources of inefficiency and their
likely stages of appearance; Chapter V described the six basic types of
industrywide voluntary product standards according to technical
function. The purpose of the chapter is to discuss, by integrating what
has come before, the role that standards can play in alleviating sources
of economic inefficiency.
To reiterate the simplifying assumptions made in Chapter III
regarding the evolution of firms in an industry through the stages of the
Abernathy-Utterback model: It is assumed that all firms in an industry
are concurrently moving through the product stages of the model, and
there are no major technological differences between their products. It
is also assumed that most firms concurrently move through the process
stages as well , though these stages may be different from the product
stages at times. Thus, reverse transition may take place, but is
constrained by the degree to which process reversal may occur. For
stages 3-5, it is assumed that the production process essentially cannot
revert.
A Matrix of the Relationship between Types of Standards and Sources of
Economic Inefficiency
Product standards transmit technical information and prescribe
behavior regarding the information's use. Each type of standard
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transmits information for a different technical function. By their
information-transmitting nature, standards in general are useful in
diminishing certain types of standards but not others. Each type of
standard can also have a unique role, and can affect different sources of
inefficiency in different ways.
On the basis of the discussion presented in Chapters IV and V, a
nunber of observations can be made concerning the role of the various
types of standards in alleviating each source of inefficiency. Table 3
presents these observations in matrix form. The "A's" indicate the
sources of inefficiency on which certain standard types can have a direct
impact. For some sources of inefficiency, certain standard types do not
have a direct impact themselves, but are used as building blocks for
standard types which do have a direct impact -- these building block
standards/source relationships are designated "B". The "C's" indicate
sources of inefficiency which can be alleviated through a standard type's
direct impact on another source of inefficiency. Here, the standard
types have an indirect impact. In certain instances of standards
development, new technological knowledge may be discovered which can
reduce inefficiency. The "D's" designate standard/source relationships
where this may occur.
72
TABLE 3
THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE TYPES OF STANDARDS ON SOURCES OF ECONOMIC
INEFFICIENCY
Types of Standards
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A Standard type has a direct impact on diminishing the source of
inefficiency.
B For the designated source of inefficiency, the standard type is
used as a building block for other standard types which have a direct
impact on diminishing the source of inefficiency.
C Standard type has an indirect impact on diminishing the source
of inefficiency through its direct impact on another source.
D In the development of the standard type, new technological
knowledge may, as a byproduct, be discovered which has a direct
impact on diminishing the source of inefficiency.
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D
C
C
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As will be seen, the economic efficiency functions of each type of
standard which do not have a direct ("A") impact on a source of
inefficiency either build toward ("B") or derive from ("C","D") a direct
impact. (The "A's" are circled because of their importance.) Thus, the
stages in which certain standards are introduced in order to have an "A"
impact affect when the "B" relationship standards are introduced and "C"
and "D" impacts occur. One primary, and obvious, consideration in the
introduction of "A" relationship standards is that the stages of
introduction should correspond to the stages in which the target sources
of inefficiency (direct and indirect) are most significant. These
stage/source relationships are depicted in Table 2 in Chapter IV.
The following section explores the potential direct impacts which
standards can have on sources and types of inefficiencies. The next
section looks at the potential negative impacts of standards. Based on
the first two, the third section discusses the appropriate stages for the
introduction of standards.
The Direct Impacts of Standards
As the "A's" in Table 3 show, product standards can have a direct
impact on uncertainties, negative externalities, and excessive
transaction costs. Table 2 indicates that the uncertainties tend to be
across most industries in the early stages (1-3) of the
Abernathy-Utterback model; uncertainties in the later stages and
externalities and excessive transaction costs may or may not be
significant in an industry. The direct impacts of standards have four
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aspects. First, terminology, measurement method and test method
standards can help decrease technological uncertainty in all stages. The
common use of terms, measures, and evaluative methods can facilitate the
sharing of information among researchers, which in turn can facilitate
problem-solving and spark new technological insights. These new insights
may be the basis for development of products with innovative
technological bases (i.e. products around which new industries form) as
well as for improvements in existing products.
Second, variety reduction standards can be used to reduce process
technological uncertainty, buyer uncertainty, market uncertainty, and
excessive transaction costs. Variety reduction standards can reduce
process technological uncertainty by reducing the number of varieties
technology developers need to concern themselves with. For instance,
after the standardization of the size of silicon wafers for photovoltaic
cells, engineers were quickly able to develop a new automated
semiconductor manufacturing process. Variety reduction standards are
likely to have the most impact on process innovations in stages 3-4, when
the frequency of major process innovations tends to be highest. (See
Figure 1 in Chapter III.)
Variety reduction standards also can reduce market uncertainty, which
tends to be significant in stages 1-3. Producers in an industry may
manufacture too many varieties of a good because they do not know to
which set of reduced offerings consumers would react without there being
a falloff in demand and profits. If members of an industry pool their
information and develop variety reduction standards which meet consumer
needs (and which do not violate antitrust laws), they can reap better
production economies of scale. The reduction in variety for market
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certainty reasons would also enable process innovations to be developed
which take advantage of the less differentiated product line.
Though the impact may be trivial, variety reduction standards can
decrease buyer uncertainty as buyers will be more familiar with a reduced
variety of product (more certain information). They can also reduce
excessive transaction costs by cutting down on search time and effort for
a desired form of the product, as sellers will be more likely to carry
that form.
Third, compatibility standards can be used to reduce buyer
uncertainty and excessive transaction costs, basically in the same manner
as variety reduction standards do. Compatibility standards enable buyers
to reduce cost uncertainties more quickly by learning that various
manufacturers' goods are interchangeable. Reduction in cost
uncertainties will lead to greater usage, and less performance
uncertainties. The standards also enable more knowledgeable and
better-trained support personnel (reduce support uncertainties) as there
are fewer idiosyncracies regarding the technical relationship between
various manufacturers'products. By reducing the need to search for
uniquely compatible parts, these standards also can reduce excessive
transaction costs.
Finally, quality standards can ameliorate buyer uncertainty and
negative externalities. These standards can assure buyers (either
through use or product reputation) that they are getting products with
reasonable output, durability, reliability or other quality attributes.
Negative externalities can be reduced through the use of
safety/environmental impact standards.
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The product standards which have a "B" impact on sources of
inefficiency are "building block" standards on which certain direct
impact standards (variety reduction, compatibility, quality) are built.
The "building block" standards are terminology, measurement method and
test method standards. Variety reduction standards often depend on the
first two; compatibility standards often and quality standards usually
rely on all three. Note that in Table 3, "B's" appear in the same row
where compatibility, variety reduction, or quality standards have "A"
impacts.
The Potential Negative Effects of Standards
Before describing the "C" and "D" impacts of standards, it is
important to discuss the potential negative effects which standards can
have, i.e. the types and sources of inefficiency which standards may
aggravate. First of all, a too concentrated market structure can be
created or enhanced if one or several firms' quality or compatibility
standards are inappropriately (i.e. not in the buyers' interest) made the
industry-wide standard. The capital required by other firms to meet the
new standards may be too high to allow them to effectively compete on
price. Secondly, variety reduction standards could excessively cut
product offerings, i.e. buyers lose more benefits (choice) then they gain
(reduced search costs and uncertainty). An excessive reduction could
also lead to greater concentration if larger firms can gain greater
economies of scale from variety reduction than do small firms.
Third, product standards can have a stultifying effect on the
development and diffusion of innovation, i.e. on dynamic efficiency.
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Compatibility standards have the potential for institutionalizing certain
aspects of a product so that switching to a better product becomes costly
for users. For example, television screens in the United States project
images of 525 lines, while those in Europe project images of up to 800
lines and so provide a much sharper picture. The U.S. screens have poorer
resolution because this country standardized its TV system earlier than
did European countries. Because all U.S. television broadcasing systems
are compatible with the 525-line screen, changeover at this point would
be very expensive.
Further, quality standards may reduce dynamic efficiency by
inhibiting technology developers from pursuing innovative ideas counter
to the thrust of the standards, particularly if the standards are in the
form of design criteria or materials specifications rather than
performance criteria. Variety reduction standards also may lower dynamic
efficiency by reducing the variation of product characteristics
technology developers can work with.
Thus, the introduction of a standard can involve a potential tradeoff
between reduction in current inefficiency and an increase in future
dynamic efficiency. The stages in which this problem is the greatest are
stages 1 and 2, when major and frequent product innovations tend to occur
and dominant design has not been accepted, and also when significant
uncertainties could be resolved through the use of standards. This
problem can be minimized by seeking not to standardize certain product
characteristics before they are generally accepted by the market, and/or
it is fairly clear that the medium-term potential for significant
technological change is low. Thus only elementary standards would be
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adopted prior to dominant design. After dominant design, standards can
become more refined and detailed as the general characteristics of the
product stabilize. In essence, standards should be adopted when the gap
between the expected benefits and the expected opportunity costs of
adoption are the greatest. This gap is, of course, difficult to measure
due to a variety of uncertainties, but standards developers can make
educated guesses.
Standards by Stage of Introduction and Nature of Direct Impact
Based on the discussions of the last two sections, Table 4 depicts
the sources of inefficiency on which each type of standard can have a
direct impact, and the complexity of standards which are appropriate for
each stage in the Abernathy-Utterback model. Compatibility, variety
reduction, and quality standards are not given any role in Stage 1.
Standardization for these functions is difficult and not appropriate in a
stage in which there are diverse and custom-made products, and there is a
high degree of product innovation occuring.
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TABLE 4
The Direct Impacts of Standard Types on Sources of Economic
Inefficiency by Stage and Complexity of Standards - for a Single Industry
Stages of Product Development
1 2 3 4 5
Technology
Measurement Method Standards
Test Method Standards
Compatibility Standards
Variety Reduction Standards
Quality Standards
- technological uncertainty--------
- technological uncertainty ----------
- technological uncertainty ----------
- buyer uncertainty ---------
- excessive trans-
action costs
- technological uncertainty -
- market
uncertainty
- buyer uncertainty ---------
- excessive trans-
action costs
- buyer uncertainty ---------
- negative externalities ----
Very
Elementary
Elementary More
Refined
as Characteristics ---
Stabilize
Complexity of
Standards
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Note that Table 4 is concerned with the stage of product development
(i.e. Column A of Table 1A), not the stage of the productive unit as a
whole. The focus of standardization is on product characteristics, not
other elements of the productive unit. The complexity of standards
should be a function of the stage of product development. If major
innovation and reverse transition occur, more complex standards may need
to be discarded and newer, more elementary ones adopted.
On the basis of the last two sections, we can surmise that much of
the standards development activity will take place soon after the
adoption of a dominant design, i.e. in stage 3. Prior to that, detailed
standards could interfere with dynamic efficiency. Subsequent to stage
3, much of buyer and technological uncertainty will have been reduced
through buyer and producer familiarity with the product technology.
(This familiarity may be facilitated by standards developed in earlier
stages). Most of market uncertainty and excessive transaction costs due
to too much product variation tend to disappear by stage 4. By
definition (Table lA) most significant product variety is gone by then.
This may be due to either implicit or explicit (stage 3) variety
reduction. Stage 2 and 3 quality standards resolving negative
externalities should significantly reduce the need for further standards
for this purpose in later stages.
Table 4 is intended to describe the role and nature of standards over
the evolution of a single industry. If several industries are competing,
the standards development activity of each is a function of the stage of
the development of its product. This goes for instances of technological
invasion as well. The table reflects a desire to achieve efficiency
benefits for society as a whole, not any particular industry. Misuse of
standards could result in an industry being better off, but not society.
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Additional Impacts of Product Standards on Sources of Economic
Inefficiency
As Table 3 relates, product standards can have two types of indirect
impacts ("C's") on sources of inefficiency through their direct impact on
other sources. First, compatibility, variety reduction, and quality
standards, by decreasing buyer uncertainty and transaction costs, can
also decrease producers' market uncertainty. If these standards help
buyers become more aggressive and confident in buying the product,
producers will receive better feedback regarding the desirability of
various product attributes. The resulting drop in market uncertainty can
generate an increase in marketplace efficiency -- producers can know
consumer wants better and respond accordingly. More market certainty can
increase the static efficiency of plant utilization and size -- this is
particularly important in stages 2 and 3, when more uncertainty exists
relative to later stages. Producers may move forward in seeking process
innovation (to respond to more certain demand), and product innovation
(in response to a clearer understanding of consumer wants).
The second type of indirect impact which standards may have is to
facilitate a more efficient market structure. In an industry with large
and small producers, increased certainty for small producers may help
make more them more competitive with large producers. If small firms are
at a disadvantage in gaining access to capital, an increase in their
dynamic and static efficiency could induce an infusion of capital, which
would widen the competition. In an industry with too little
concentration, greater buyer, technological and market certainty and a
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reduction in transaction costs could induce the process innovations which
require a greater volume of production, and less efficient firms would be
weeded out. Of course, there is a danger in any industry that process
innovations induced by greater certainty would cause too much
concentration and marketplace inefficiency.
As mentioned earlier, the timing of indirect impacts of standards are
a function of the stages in which the standards are developed. Impacts
may occur during or after the stage of standards introduction. Because
the indirect impacts are tied to compatibility, variety reduction, and
quality standards, the indirect impacts will tend to occur in and after
stages 2 and 3.
In the process of developing all types of standards, new
technological knowledge may be discovered as a byproduct. This knowledge
may result in a reduction in two sources of inefficiency (a "D" impact of
standards). First, the new knowledge can reduce technological
uncertainty. Second, it can diminish the negative impact of the public
good nature of technical information. Firms in an industry may be
somewhat reluctant to invest in product innovation if rival firms can
obtain and use the new technical information at little cost. The
discovery of information through standards development is one way of
overcoming effects of this reluctance on dynamic efficiency.
As the reader will notice, Table 3 shows that product standards have
no impact on narrow management focus or the nature of the production
process required to be competitive. Narrow management focus is a
function of management skills, an organizational problem that cannot be
relieved by a reduction in uncertainty. In fact, if a firm is too
oriented towards dealing with static problems, greater certainty could
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exacerbate a narrow management focus. In early stages, competition in
product performance requires the nature of the production process to be
flexible, at the expense of some static efficiency; in later stages,
competition over cost requires a rigid, capital-intensive production
process, at the expense of dynamic efficiency. Standards cannot
significantly affect the existence of these tradeoffs between static and
dynamic efficiency -- the tradeoffs are a function of process technology
options and the focus of competition (cost/performance).
The Degree of Impact of Standards
When talking about an industry in the abstract, it is very difficult
to say which standards have the greatest impact, which type of impacts
("A", "B", "C", "D") are most important, and which sources and types of
inefficiency diminish to yield the greatest impact. In particular, one
should be aware that direct impacts need not be more important than other
types of impacts. The importance of each impact (each cell of Table 3)
varies from industry to industry, and is a function of the industry's
product, degree of untapped technological potential, types of product
users, market structure, and so on. Thus, the discussion in this chapter
has been mostly oneof direction and dynamics behind an impact, not degree
of impact. It does seem possible that impacts which open up dynamic
efficiency may have the highest payoff because the potential for
increases in dynamic efficiency is open-ended, while those for static and
marketplace efficiency are limited by definition.
One also should not equate the degree and stage of impact with the
level and stage of standards development activity. While it is likely
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much activity goes on in stage 3, the greatest impacts could be due to
the elementary standards developed in stage 2, again depending on the
industry. Further, standards produced in one stage also may reap
benefits in future stages.
Summary and Conclusions
As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of this paper was to be a
theoretical thinkpiece regarding the role that industrywide voluntary
product standards can play in stimulating economic efficiency.
Specifically, three questions were posed:
1) What sources of economic inefficiency can industrywide voluntary
product standards help mitigate?
2) What are the appropriate chronological points in product
development and diffusion for the promulgation of standards?
3) What are the dangers that standards can exacerbate certain
certain sources of inefficiency while resolving others, and what are
some ways these dangers can be avoided?
The answers to the questions were arrived at through the use of
several building blocks. First, using a mixture of neoclassical
microeconomics and ideas based on the work of F.M. Scherer and Burton
Klein, three types of economic efficiencies were defined. Second, a
model of sequential patterns of product and process innovations in an
industry was developed, drawing on the work of William Abernathy and
James Utterback. Third, these first two building blocks were integrated
in a discussion of the sources of inefficiency which tend to appear
during evolution of an industry. Fourth, the basic types of industrywide
voluntary product standards, differentiated by technical functions, were
identified.
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These four building blocks provided the conceptual foundation for
generating answers to the initial questions. Essentially, standards were
found to have four means of positively affecting sources of inefficiency
-- direct impacts, indirect impacts, impacts through use as a building
block for other standards, and impacts through the discovery of new
technological knowledge. In particular, standards were found to have a
potential direct impact on uncertainties, negative externalities, and
excessive transaction costs.
The discussion of the major potential negative effect of standards --
stultifying dynamic efficiency -- led to a recommendation that only
elementary standards be developed for a product if further frequent
product innovations seem likely, and that standards be refined only as
product characteristics seem to stabilize. Several other possible
negative effects of standards on dynamic and marketplace efficiency were
mentioned.
It is hoped that this paper has offered significant and constructive
elements of a theory of the role industrywide voluntary product standards
can play in increasing economic efficiency. Clearly, many of the details
of the theory need to be proved or disproved by empirical studies. In
any case, the paper should provide a framework, a theoretical jumping-off
point, from which further exploration of the economic role of standards
can take place.
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APPENDIX1
The industrywide voluntary standards setting system in the United
States is a complex one, with the Federal government having a relatively
minor role. Primarily, industrywide voluntary product standards are developed by
three types of organizations--trade associations, professional societies,
and national standards organizations.
Trade Associations
Typically, trade associations are non-profit organizations comprised
of independent businesses in a single industry and established to improve
the financial position of their respective members. The associations
usually provide members with informational services and technical
assistance; coordinate joint membership efforts concerning research,
advertising, and standards development; and represent members before
government and the public.
While the nature of standards development activities varies from
trade association to association, there are a few similarities.
Standards for an industry's products are usually produced through the
development of consensus among trade association members. Sometimes an
association will invite consumers or public representatives to sit on
standards-writing committees. However, consier representation is not
usually provided on any systematic basis, and the representatives are
rarely given voting power. Trade associations often send representatives
to the committees of the national standards organizations.
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Professional Societies
Professional societies are organized along the same lines as trade
associations, except that members are individuals rather than firms.
Membership policies of professional societies are typically more
restrictive than those of trade associations. Membership is often
stratified according to years of education and practice, and professional
accomplishments.
Professional societies carry out many of the same functions as trade
associations. They represent the profession before government and the
public, provide information and support services to members, and provide
a forum for discussion of profession-related issues. The typical
professional society also takes an active role in research and
educational matter.
The extent to which professional associations are involved in product
standards-writing activities varies according to their concern with
technical matters. Even so, some technical professional societies are
more active in standards-writing than others. Professional societies
active in standards writing include the Association for Heating,
Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), the Association of
Official Analytical Chemists, and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers(IEEE). Typically, professional societies develop
test method standards, and leave minimum quality standards to trade
associations. Two major exceptions to this pattern are the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME), which do develop product quality standards. Most
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technically-oriented professional societies, whether active in writing
their own standards or not, send representatives to national standards
writing organizations.
National Standards Organizations
The most active standards-writing organization in the United States
is the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). ASTM is a
national non-profit scientific, technical and educational society. It
was established in 1898 for the purpose of promoting knowledge of
engineering and standardizing specifications and test methods.
Presently, ASTM's primary work concerns standardization and research in
material inputs, particularly regarding quality and test methods, and with
less emphasis on dimensional standards and design.
ASTM membership includes both individuals and organizations. It
develops standards upon request from trade associations, governmental
agencies, professional societies, manufacturers, universities, consumer
groups, and individuals. After making sure that there is no other
ongoing standards activity related to a request, all interested parties
are invited to a planning and organizational meeting, usually at ASTM
headquarters in Philadelphia.
Standards development in ASTM is carried out through standing main
committees. A standards document is first drafted by a task force, which
sends the results to its parent subcommittee, which in turn sends the
results to its parent main committee. In the main committee, 90% of
those returning ballots must approve the document (at least a 60% return
is required). The document then goes to a Society ballot, which means
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that each of ASTM's 26,000 members can comment on the proposed standard.
Again, 90% of the ballots must be affirmative (a minimum of 50 ballots is
required). Finally, a committee of ASTM's Board of Directors must see
that all procedural requirements for approval have been met.
Standards developed by ASTM are known as "full consensus standards"
because their development must follow rigorous due process considerations,
something which often is not so in trade associations. The principles
of due process include: adequate notice of the proposed standards de-
velopment process to all persons, companies and organizations likely
to be affected, opportunity for all affected interests to participate
in the standards development, maintenance of adequate records, adequate
notice of proposed action, and careful attention and consideration of
minority opinions throughout the process.
Two other important national standards organizations are the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and Underwriters Laboratory (UL). The
NFPA develops fire protection standards for a variety of products. It
often collaborates with other standards organizations, e.g., it developed
a series of standards with the American Gas Association concerning gas
appliances and gas piping. The Underwriters Laboratory is a non-profit
corporation sponsored by American Insurance Association. It is primarily
a testing laboratory which rates products and materials in regard to fire
and other safety hazards. UL also develops product standards -- material
specifications, design criteria, test methods, and recommended practices
regarding product use.
The last national standards organization to be considered is the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a voluntary federation of
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more than 400 standards-writing bodies in the United States. ANSI has
three principal functions. It serves as the national coordinator for
voluntary standardization in the U.S. It helps to identify specific
needs for standards and arranges for organizations to develop them. In
the event that a standards-writing organization does not exist in a
particular area of need, ANSI organizes technical committees to draft the
standards. It has organized over 170 technical committees. By its
constitution, ANSI may not write standards, so each technical committee
is formally located within a member standards-writing institution. As
coordinat ANSI also attempts to prevent the duplication of
standards-writing activity.
ANSI's second function is to approve American National (consensus)
Standards. These are submitted to ANSI for approval by other
standards-writing organizations. To be accepted as an Amerian National
Standard, a standard must have been developed by the sponsoring
organization via a rigorous procedure in compliance with due process.
The third major function of ANSI is to represent the standards
position of the United States in international non-treaty organization
with which it is affiliated. Examples of these international
organizations are the International Organization for Standards and the
International Electrotechnical Commission.
The National Bureau of Standards
For the most part, the Federal government becomes involved in the
voluntary standards process through the National Bureau of Standards
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(NBS), an arm of U.S. Department of Commerce. NBS was established in
1901 to meet the national demand for a unified measurement system. It
has several functions. It is responsible for the custody, maintenance
and development of national measurement standards, and provision of means
and methods for making measurements consistent with those standards. It
also does research in the properties of materials, advises the goverment
on scientific matters, and generates innovations. Finally, it develops
test methods for materials, mechanisms, and structures, and cooperates
with private standards-writing organizations in the development of
voluntary standards.
NBS does not establish mandatory standards; rather, it develops
voluntary measurement and test method standards for others to use. It
has a long history of cooperation with the voluntary standards sector.
NBS is represented on the boards of ANSI and ASTM. About 250 NBS staff
members serve on ASTM technical committees, and the agency is represented
by others on additional standards-writing groups.
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Notes
Chapter 1
1. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G. & C.
Merriam Co., 1974), p. 1133.
2. According to David Hemenway, there are over 400 standards-writing
organizations in the U.S. However, in 1964, 3 organizations
accounted for 50% of the standards written, and another 15 accounted
for 20%. Source: Industrywide Voluntary Product Standards
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 19/b).
3. Hemenway, op. cit.
Chapter 2
1. It is best said that the formulation of the notion of dynamic
efficiency in this paper is only inspired by Klein, because he never
provides a good operational definition of the term. That had to be
developed by this author.
2. In Dynamic Economics, Klein says that dynamic efficiency is "the
result of extending the (production-possibilities) frontier by
exploiting as fully as possible a technological potential (p.35)."
This idea is incomplete. Not all innovations extend the frontier;
some change its composition.
Generally, extension of the frontier is thought of as being due to
process innovations. What about product innovations? Many product
innovations are bought by businesses for use in the process of
producing goods and services and in that sense they extend the
production-possibility curve. For example, word processors
presumably make the operation in the headquarters of a publishing
company more cost-efficient -- more books can be produced with the
same resources.
What about household product innovations? If refrigerators replace
iceboxes on the production-possibility curve, the curve is not
necessarily extended. What changes is the composition of the curve.
As a refrigerator presumably has more utility per dollar than an
icebox, society is getting greater utility out of its resources.
3. Klein believes that U.S. government economic policy needs to
stimulate a higher degree of dynamic efficiency in order to make the
U.S. more competitive in the world market. He sees the rise and
decline of British and U.S. economic fortunes as a function of
national dynamic efficiency, and attributes current Japanese and West
German success to their relatively high frequency of product and
process innovation.
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4. Scherer, F.M., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,
2nd ed., (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1979), p.
429.
5. Klein, Burton, Dynamic Economics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977), p. /0.
6. Scherer, op.cit. , p. 428.
7. Ibid., p. 429.
Chapter 3
1. Abernathy, William J., The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to
Innovation in the Automobile Industry (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 19/8), Chapters 4 and 7.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 68.
4. Ibid., pp. 156-160.
5. Ibid., p. 80. It is not entirely clear what the authors mean by "a
normal rate ... of technological progress." We know and they say
elsewhere that different industries take different lengths of time to
evolve. Perhaps they mean there is a normal frequency (i.e. rate) of
innovation over time.
6. Ibid., p. 83.
7. Ibid., p. 70.
8. Ibid., p. 77.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 150.
11. Ibid.
12. Michael Piore, in his book (co-authored with Suzanne Berger) entitled
Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1980), describes four determinants of process technological
innovation: 1) size of the market, 2) degree of product
standardization, 3) degree of market stability, and 4) degree of
producer certainty regarding market demand patterns. The greater
these factors, the more impetus for process innovations, resulting in
specialized equipment, rigid production process, and de-skilled
jobs. Piore makes explicit what is somewhat hidden in Abernathy and
Utterback's model; the two theories are quite consistent.
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13. Abernathy, op. cit, p. 150.
14. Ibid, p. 75.
15. Ibid, pp. 151-152.
16. Ibid, p. 152.
17. Ibid, p. 82.
18. Ibid, p. 70.
19. Ibid, pp. 153-4.
20. Ibid.,p. 168.
21. The factual assertions made in this section are taken from an
unpublished paper by James Utterback entitled, "What are the Systems
for Innovation: Micro and Macro," presented at the American Chemical
Society and Industrial Research Institute Symposium on Innovation in
Industry, Washington, D.C.. September 3-5, 1979. Part of the
discussion of specific industries in Utterback's paper is based on
studies cited by him.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. A mantle: "a lacey hood or sheath of some refractory material that
ives light by incandescence when placed over a flame." Webster's New
ollegiate Dictionary, p. 700.
27. Abernathy, op.cit., p. 83.
Chapter 4
1. Abernathy and Utterback never say whether or not in-house technology
developers reside within the productive unit. For the purposes of
the analysis, we will assume they do not.
2. Linden, Lawrence and Drew Bottaro, Jacob Moskowitz, and William
Ocasio, The Solar Photovoltaic Industry: The Status and Evolution
of the Technology and the Institutions (MIT Energy Laboratory Report
NO. Mil-LL //-UZI, Uecember 19//), p. /2.
3. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
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4. "How 'Silicon Spies' Get Away with Copying," Business Week, April 21,
1980.
5. Klein, op. cit., p. 53.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, p. 77.
8. Utterback, op.cit.
Chapter 5
1. Hemenway, op. cit., p. 26.
2. American Society for Testing and Materials, "Principles and Practices
of Standardization" (date unknown), pp. 8-9.
3. Ibid.
4. Society of Automotive Engineers, SAE Handbook 1979 (part 2), p. 27.07.
5. ASTM, op. cit., p. 9.
5. Hemenway, op. cit., p. 60.
6. Ibid., p. 37.
7. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
8. Society of Automotive Engineers, op. cit., p. 34.06.
9. American Gas Association, American National Standard for
Refrigeration Using Gas Fuel (Arlington, Va: 1975), p. 26.
10. Society of Automotive Engineers, op. cit., p. 34.06.
11. American Gas Association, op. cit., p. 22.
12. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American National Standard
for Steel Valves (New York: 1977).
13. American Society for Testing and Materials, 1979 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards--Part 38 (Philadelphia), p. 483-5.
14. Society of Automotive Engineers, op. cit., p. 36.07.
15. American Gas Association, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
16. American Gas Association, American National Standard for Gas-Fired
Duct Furnaces (Arlington, VA: 191), p. 29.
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Chapter 6.
1. However, product standards for the production process equipment may
directly or indirectly reduce the cost/benefit ratio in a tradeoff,
allowing more flexibility for given economies of scale, or vice versa.
APPENDIX
1. The information in the Appendix is drawn from two sources:
Parker, Barbara and Thomas E. Nutt-Powell, Institutional Analysis of
Standards Setting in the United States: A Preliminary Exploration
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Laboratory Working
Paper MIT-EL-79-019WP; Cambridge, MA: 1979).
American Society for Testing and Materials,"Standardization Basics."
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